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ABSTRACT 
Charter schools have been categorized as "everyone's reform" (Bracey, 2004); 
they are a type of public school, first established in 1992, that normally has fewer 
restrictions than most public schools and that serves a student body that, in many 
circumstances, has consciously opted to attend the school. Charter schools have promised 
high student achievement and program options that would create healthy competition in 
the American educational market. Currently, in California alone, there are approximately 
800 active charter schools that serve more than 340,000 pupils. 
As we close in on nearly twenty years of charter school reform, many charter 
schools could be considered successful. Every year, however, some have their charters 
either revoked or not renewed due to a variety of reasons including deficiencies in 
academic programming, poor student achievement, or improper fiscal mismanagement. 
According to the California Department of Education (2010), twenty-five percent of the 
1,152 charter schools that have opened in California since 1992 have closed permanently, 
with more than forty closings due to charter revocation. To date, however, there has been 
very little research on charter school closures. 
This qualitative study attempted to (a) determine which types of California charter 
schools have closed, (b) discover the reasons the schools' former leaders give for the 
closures, as well as compare official reasons for closure with the schools' former leaders 
stated reasons for closure, and (c) solicit any advice the former leaders would offer others 
wanting to begin, or continue to successfully operate, a charter school. 
Reasons the former directors gave for their schools' closures included: (a) conflict 
with their sponsoring agent, (b) a negative relationship with their superintendent, (c) 
problems with facilities, (d) financial problems, (e) working ineffectively with a business 
partner, and (f) perceived unethical behavior by a business partner. Advice offered by 
these directors included the importance of securing and controlling finances at the site 
level, developing and maintaining collaborative relationships with sponsoring agents, 
beginning a charter school with a specific vision, not allowing a business entity to operate 
a charter school, and maintaining a high level of energy and enthusiasm. 
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Bracey (2004) has categorized charter schools as "everyone's reform." This 
statement suggests that a diverse constituency—everyone from those who supported the 
"alternative school" movement of the 1970s to those who support vouchers to politicians, 
parents, and educators of varied philosophical and pedagogical persuasions—has 
embraced the potential charter school solution to our nation's educational problems. 
Charter schools are a type of public school, a type that was first established in 
1992. They are typically started by educators, parents, or some other organized group, 
sponsored by a state or local school board, and governed by a charter that creates 
autonomy at the school level and independence in the educational choices for teachers, 
parents, and students. 
Charter schools, in fact, were designed to provide more freedom for educators 
and parents who felt that their current set of educational choices was highly constrained. 
In exchange for this new-found freedom, charter school operators are given responsibility 
for improving student achievement and insuring proper fiscal management. In fact, 
charter schools have the same requirements as other schools under the Federal No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2008. This act, in part, requires schools to achieve 
"Adequate Yearly Progress" (AYP) toward specified targeted increases in standardized 
test scores. Charter schools are expected to meet either the goals set forth in their charter, 
or the AYP goals set by NCLB, whichever are more rigorous. If a school, whether a 
regular public school or a charter school, does not meet the minimum AYP requirements, 
a possible consequence is reorganization of that school, including replacing faculty and 
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administrators. Additionally, students in schools (including charter schools) that are not 
meeting or exceeding AYP goals may receive supplemental services and the choice to opt 
out of the school they attend and move to another school within the district (Hill and 
Guin, 2003). Ironically, if traditional public schools do not meet their AYP goals, one of 
the state's suggested remedies is to convert them into charter schools. 
As we close in on nearly twenty years of charter school reform, many charter 
schools could be considered successful (Hill & Lake, 2002; Hoxby, 2004; Edwards et. al., 
2009). However, there are charter schools that have either closed or have had their 
charters revoked by the agency that sponsored them in the first place. The charter 
community, as well as the public school community at large, can learn tremendous 
amounts of valuable information through quantitative and qualitative analysis of these 
closed charter schools. 
Background to the Study 
As has already been noted above, charter schools are public schools that are 
overseen by charter authorizers and supported, financially and/or in other ways, by 
official sponsors. Charter schools are guided by a charter petition which outlines the 
purpose, vision, and mission of the school. Manno, Vanourek and Finn (2000) describe 
charter schools as organizations that offer us insight into what a revitalized and more 
responsible public education system might look like. 
Minnesota passed the first charter school law in 1991, and the first United States 
charter school opened in that state in 1992. California soon followed, passing charter 
school law in 1992. There are currently more than 3,500 charter schools operating 
nationwide; these schools serve over one million students. 
3 
In California alone, there are approximately 800 active charter schools with more 
than 340,000 pupils. Within this group of California charter schools, Wells, Lopez, Scott, 
and Holme (1999) found that California charter schools generally fit into six categories: 
a) urban, ethnocentric, and grassroots charters, b) home schooling/independent study 
programs, c) charter schools founded by charismatic educational leaders, d) teacher-led 
charters, e) parent-led charters, and finally, f) entrepreneur initiated charters. These 
categories will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
The reasons for the initial and continued infusion of charter schools into the 
California educational system in particular are summarized by the Excellence in Public 
Education Facilities Department (CA) as follows: 
Public charter schools offer an important and timely public school option to 
address the challenges facing our traditional education system. Charter schools 
are an exciting and high-potential alternative for the following reasons: 
1) Most efforts to reform high-need public schools in California have failed. 
Charter schools provide parents the opportunity to offer real input in their child's 
education. 
2) Charter schools give educators freedom to try new strategies to inspire student 
achievement. 
3) Charter schools, less encumbered by the bureaucratic barriers that face other 
public schools, have the potential to spark system-wide change. 
Charter schools are schools of choice for many children and their families. 
Charter school advocates and opponents alike are also interested in whether or not 
charter schools have had an impact on the current educational system. The logic, here, is 
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simple: Since charter schools are public schools, the act of sharing their successes and 
failures has the potential to improve the achievement of students in traditional public 
schools. 
Of course, not all charter schools are successful. Every year a substantial number 
of charter schools have their charters either revoked or not renewed. According to Gary 
Larson from the California Charter Schools Association, about eight percent of charter 
schools either close voluntarily or are forced to shut down by their districts due to issues 
such as mismanagement or lack of facilities (Gao, 2006). At the very least, the closure of 
charter schools provides a potential learning opportunity; often, more can be learned from 
failure than success. The lessons learned from studying the reasons behind charter school 
closures should be useful both to those who want to start other charter schools and also 
those within the existing educational system who want to develop a deeper understanding 
of schools and the problems within them. 
Statement of the Problem 
Unfortunately, up to this point, there has been very little research on charter 
schools that have closed. We do know that some charter schools are closing, either 
because they have had their charters revoked or not renewed by their charter authorizer, 
or as a result of a self-initiated process. According to the California Department of 
Education (2010), twenty-five percent of the 1,152 charter schools that have opened in 
California since 1992 have closed permanently, with more than forty closings due to 
charter revocation. 
We also know that, historically, the main reasons leading to charter school 
closures have been faulty management or deficiencies in academic programming 
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(Vergari, 1999). The U.S. Department of Education, for example, indicates that "failure 
to meet student achievement goals and expectations" is one of the most frequent reasons 
that charters are revoked. The achievement goal issue can be more complex for charter 
schools than for traditional public schools. Although the California Charter Act of 1992 
holds schools accountable for meeting student outcomes, some charter schools may 
conceivably meet the academic goals set forth in their charter but fail according to the 
standards specified in the NCLB Act. 
Whatever the reasons are for charter schools' closures, the literature available 
does not clearly specify which types of charters are closing, nor does the research fully 
describe terms, such as "faulty management" or "deficiencies in the academic program." 
The opinions and advice of those involved with the closed schools—for example, 
administrators, directors and/or principals—have not been explored in any systematic 
way. As a result, it is not clear what suggested precautionary measures leaders of other 
charter schools might undertake to avoid shutting the doors of their charter schools. 
According to the National Study of Charter Schools conducted by the U. S. 
Department of Education (1998), charter schools that have been forced— or that have 
decided on their own— to close, represent a very small proportion of the number of 
schools granted charters. A study conducted in 2002 by The Center for Educational 
Reform found, once again, that the number of closures was relatively small when 
compared to the growing number of charter schools that have been created. 
Unfortunately, neither study explored the reasons for closure from the perspective of the 
administrators that worked at those particular schools. Consequently, there is a need to 
study charter schools that have closed and why closures have occurred, so that those 
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interested in opening charter schools in the future may learn from their colleagues' 
unique experiences. 
Additionally, as noted above, traditional public schools that have failed in the 
eyes of the federal government may convert to charter school status under the regulations 
ofNCLB. Those involved in this transitional process may also benefit from the lessons 
learned by those who have been a part of a charter school closure. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study, therefore, attempted to discover the internal and external reason(s) the 
schools' former leaders give for the closures, investigate what (if anything) those 
administrators involved feel could have prevented closure, and explore the advice they 
would give to current and future charter school leaders. Schools categorized as 
employing home schooling/independent study programs were initially excluded from this 
study, since the focus of the study is on charter schools in physical locations that are 
more reflective of typical educational settings; however, two schools were 
miscategorized within closure documentation, and I did not clearly understand their 
hybrid nature (a combination of independent study and onsite student/teacher meetings) 
until the qualitative interviews occurred. Charter schools identified by the U.S. 
Department of Education as "abandoned," "inactive," or "withdrawn" are also not 
included in this study. These identifiers are unpacked more fully in Chapter Three of this 
study. 
The following questions were the initial guide for this dissertation study: 
1) Using the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999) typology, which types of 
California charter schools have closed? 
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2) What are the reasons for the school closure? 
a) What was the official legal reason for closure? 
b) What reasons do administrators give for the school closing? 
3) In retrospect, what, if anything, do the administrators of closed charter schools 
believe could have been done (through training, education, or other means) to 
prevent the school from closing? 
4) What information do the administrators feel would be helpful to those wanting to 
open charter schools in the future? 
The study, however, changed as data were collected. The explanation of the evolution 
of the study is addressed further in Chapter Three. This study now addresses the 
following two research questions: 
1) What are the reasons former charter school leaders give for the closure of their 
schools? 
2) What advice do these former charter school leaders offer to those who are 
interested in starting or continuing a charter school? 
Significance of the Study 
In addition to assisting those who are interested in starting and/or maintaining 
charter school status, this study impacts those involved in traditional public schools due 
to the requirements of NCLB. According to the U.S. Department of Education (2010), 
children who attend schools that are identified as needing improvement have the 
opportunity to attend charter schools within their district. Results of this study can 
influence how traditional public school management can improve their practices so that 
they can meet the federal goals set forth for them. Additionally, schools that remain in the 
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"needs improvement" category according to NCLB for more than three years are subject 
to corrective action and restructuring (including a takeover or complete reorganization of 
the school), which includes converting a school to charter school status. The results of 
this dissertation study may be of help to those who find themselves converting from 
traditional public school to charter school status. Finally, the information gathered from 
this study can assist those colleges and universities that are considering or currently 
operating charter school development programs. The conclusions from this study could 
guide curriculum development and impact the incorporation of certain key elements into 
college programs that will help train successful charter school operators and employees. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter Two situates this study in the context of current charter school literature 
by organizing the literature into categories which are helpful in analyzing and evaluating 
charter school performance, successes, and closures. Chapter Three describes the original 
research design, the problems that arose with that design, and the methods that were 
employed in the re-designed study. Chapter Four presents the case studies that were 
constructed from the interview data, as well as cross-case analysis which generated 
themes across some of the case studies. The final chapter focuses on the issues that 
emerged when looking across the nine cases, discusses implications for policy and 
practice, and considers the implications of this study for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This dissertation study will examine charter schools that have closed with an eye 
toward beginning to understand the issues mentioned in the previous chapter. Before 
describing the methods that will be used in this examination, however, the existing 
literature will be reviewed. The review will be organized around the following topics: 
characteristics of charter schools, charter schools' impact on the existing educational 
system, measures of success and achievement, and charter school problems/ reasons for 
failure. 
Characteristics of Charter Schools 
Typologies 
According to Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999), there are six categories of 
charter schools: 
(a). Urban/Ethnocentric/Grassroots: these schools are born out of frustration with an 
educational system that does not address a particular group's history, needs, or 
experiences. 
(b). Home school/independent study: These schools attract a wide variety of families 
who have the freedom to spend time with their children and who range from 
conservative to liberal. 
(c). Charters founded by charismatic educational leaders: Schools in this category are 
founded on a desire for more curricular, pedagogical, and/or fiscal autonomy from the 
local school district. 
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(d). Teacher-led charters: Schools in this category are more focused on instructional 
programs and also tend to be conversion schools (schools that had previously been 
traditional public schools). 
(e). Parent-led charters: These charter schools have a core of extremely involved 
parents who work with educators to move toward writing policies and procedures for 
the charter. 
(f). Entrepreneur-initiated charters: These schools are typically in urban areas and 
tend to serve at-risk populations. 
Although the use of the categories developed in the above-mentioned study is 
appropriate for this dissertation since Wells et. al. developed the typology exclusively 
utilizing California charter schools, it is important to take note of searches for other 
typologies and other attempts to categorize charter schools. Carpenter (2005), for 
instance, found that charter schools in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Texas 
fell into five categories: traditional, progressive, vocational, general and alternative 
delivery. As defined in the aforementioned study, traditional charter schools "stress high 
standards in academics and behavior, rigorous classes, lots of homework, and other 
earmarks of a back-to-basics approach" (p. 3). Progressive charter schools focus on 
holistic learning and emphasize "student-centered, hands-on, project-based, and 
cooperative" (p. 4) activities. Vocational charter schools focus on practicality and work-
study programs that give students real life experiences in their education. General charter 
schools in no way look any different than other traditional public schools in the district in 
which they reside. These schools tended to be conversion charter schools—schools that 
converted from a traditional public school to a charter school for a variety of reasons. 
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Finally, alternative delivery charter schools include home study and/or virtual, online 
classroom approaches to teaching and learning. 
Another study categorized charter schools by their founding organizations or 
organizers (Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005). The general categories 
generated from this multiple state study were mission-oriented and market-oriented 
schools. Little evidence was found to document variations across the two categories. 
Results of this study indicated that "external environment and core educational tasks may 
impose similar patterns of behavior on charter schools regardless of their differing 
organizational roots" (p. 37). 
Measures of Success and Achievement 
It can be argued that charter schools were invented, partially, to create greater 
accountability in public school education (Manno and Finn, 1998). Student achievement 
is invariably linked to accountability, which in turn affects the success or failure of a 
charter school. This section will review literature on accountability, student achievement, 
and factors that influence student achievement within the charter school movement. 
Accountability 
According to Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001), charter school accountability is "the 
process by which authorizers of charter schools and other stakeholders, such as parents 
and students, ensure that charter schools meet their goals" (p. 348). Accountability has 
been found to be the most challenging issue surrounding charter schools in existence for 
at least five years (Manno, Finn, and Vanourek, 2000). The United States Department of 
Education, in fact, indicates that "the failure to meet student achievement goals and 
expectations" as one of the three most frequently cited reasons that charters are revoked. 
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Because charter schools have more freedom, they are also seen as having a greater 
responsibility and greater accountability. As public schools, charter schools are 
accountable for, primarily, the use of their funds and student achievement. If anything, 
accountability pressures are greater in charter schools than in regular schools because the 
price for that freedom from rules and regulations is accountability and results (Bracey, 
2005; Griffin and Wohlstetter, 2001). 
The California Charter Act of 1992 holds charter schools accountable for meeting 
measurable student outcomes (such as California standardized tests and the California 
High School Exit Exam). Charter schools in California must participate in the same state-
wide testing as non-charter public schools and are required to meet their Annual Yearly 
Progress under the stipulations of NCLB. 
California charter school law provides a method of switching from rule-based 
(certain things must be done) to performance-based (results are what matter) 
accountability systems (Edwards et. al., 2009). Charter schools in California may utilize 
assessment tools other than state tests—e.g., various forms of performance-based 
assessment—as part of the school's own instructional program to determine whether or 
not there is student growth in academic achievement. 
Some charter school supporters point to the closure of charter schools as evidence 
that the charter concept works. By this, they mean that charter schools are being held 
accountable and will be closed if they do not succeed on a variety of levels (U. S. 
Department of Education, 1998). 
The examination of charter schools suggests another kind of accountability to 
which charter schools are subject. As eluded to earlier, charter schools have the potential 
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to serve as labs for the rest of the educational community (Adelman, 2000). Research 
conducted by Bohte (2004) suggests that charter schools may promote systemic 
improvements in public education. A legitimate question, therefore, is: Have charter 
schools lived up to the expectation that they will stimulate change in the existing 
educational system? 
A number of studies conclude that charter schools modestly influence overall 
performance improvements for students enrolled in comparable traditional public schools 
(Bohte, 2004; Zimmer et. al., 2003; Manno et. al., 2000). In a report entitled, "Charter 
Schools: Still Making Waves'", The Center for Education Reform (2005) states that the 
presence of charter schools in a district does appear to help bring about stronger 
performance gains for students enrolled in traditional public schools in the same district 
or geographic area. For example, a study done by Hoxby in 2001 demonstrated that 
traditional public schools in Arizona and Michigan that had charter schools in close 
proximity showed greater scores in math and/or reading than traditional public schools 
that did not have charters within their areas. Although the finding may seem positive for 
charter schools, it is unclear whether or not selection bias was taken into account; in other 
words, parents or caregivers who choose to send their children to charter schools seem to 
be well-informed, know their options for educational choices, and typically intend to send 
their children to a particular charter school. 
On the other hand, some charter schools maintain their neighborhood school 
status. In these cases, parents simply send their child to the charter school because it is 
the local school their child would have attended whether or not the school was charter. 
What is clear, however, is that charter schools, in at least some cases, create a market-like 
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environment that offer parents and students the ability to leave under-performing schools 
and attend more innovative and less bureaucratic educational settings. 
In theory, charter schools commit themselves to educational outcomes through 
charter contracts. Each charter school contract is a compact that binds the school to 
certain student outcomes and a system of accountability in exchange for state funds. As 
mentioned earlier, states relieve charter schools from certain state laws and regulations in 
exchange for charter petitions and agreements that outline specific outcomes. Educational 
plans and precise educational goals for students must be articulated in the charter, along 
with the means to achieve the defined end (Mead & Green, 2001). 
Charter schools are also held accountable by presenting their progress to their 
chartering agency (generally every five years, depending on the terms of the state's 
charter school laws) in order to renew their charter school status. Charter school laws 
from state to state typically require three specific criteria (Griffin & Wohlstetter, 2001; 
Finn, Bierlein & Manno, 1996): 
(a). Reasonable progress on meeting each school's own goals for its students. 
(b). Standards of fiscal management concerning the proper use of funds. 
(c). General probity and avoidance of scandal. 
How these criteria are measured as well as the definitions of terms such as "reasonable," 
"proper use of funds," and "scandal" are unclear and vary from state to state and district 
to district. 
Although there are some similar (albeit general) requirements that all charter 
schools are accountable for, one factor is certain: charter schools must be held 
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responsible for producing high student performance. The next subtopic reviews some of 
the key literature on the topic of student achievement. 
Student Achievement 
This section is divided into two topics. First, I will discuss the comparisons made 
between the student achievement in charter and non-charter schools. Second, I will 
introduce and analyze the literature regarding the use of standardized testing to measure 
student achievement in charter schools. 
Comparisons between charter and non-charter schools. Current research 
demonstrates inconsistency and contradictory findings with respect to whether or not 
charter schools are more effective than traditional schools in promoting higher student 
achievement (Slovacek, et. al., 2002; Hill & Lake, 2002; Manno, 2001). For example, in 
February 2002, the Boston Herald reported that many charter schools were outperforming 
schools in their home districts. The San Joaquin Record (February 2006) also detailed the 
above-average Academic Performance Index scores of three local area charter schools. 
Conversely, Newsweek (July 2002) and The New York Times (August 2006) noted that 
recent reports on charter schools reflect that charters are not fulfilling all of their 
promises of better educational performance. 
Hill and Lake (2002) compared test scores between charter schools and traditional 
public schools in ten states. The socioeconomic status and race of students were 
controlled in establishing comparison groups. Additionally, test scores were weighted to 
reflect school size. The study's findings indicated that, while Colorado charter schools 
had outperformed their non-charter public school counterparts at a statistically significant 
level, the charter schools in the other states had not. 
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Another study conducted by Carolyn Hoxby of Harvard University (2004) 
compared fourth grade students' reading and math proficiency in charter schools and 
traditional public schools in the same neighborhoods. Hoxby compared elementary 
charter schools with traditional elementary neighborhood schools that had similar student 
populations. In the study by Hoxby, charter students generally outperformed their peers 
in states where charter schools are well-established. There is a potential problem with the 
design of Hoxby's study, however. Although charter schools and traditional public 
schools may share neighborhoods, their student populations may be slightly to 
dramatically different due to enrollment procedures, even if charter schools use lotteries 
as the author suggests. Many times, the families that "opt in" to charter schools are well-
informed and select the charter school carefully. Additionally, this study only looked at 
fourth grade standardized test scores, although the study included ninety-nine percent of 
elementary charter schools. 
A logistic regression study that controlled for school characteristics and was 
conducted by researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2004) concluded that 
in all but one eighth grade level cohort, "charter schools are better than traditional public 
schools at insuring that students achieve the proficient level of performance" (p. 26). As 
mentioned with the Hoxby study, this study does not seem to have been controlled for 
selection bias and, consequently, for selection effects. 
Finally, another study reported by the Charter School Development Center in 
2003 suggests that charter school performance may increase with time. The study found 
California charter schools open for five or more years outperformed all California 
traditional public schools; however, California charter schools open for less than five 
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years fell behind all California traditional public schools and California charter schools 
open for five or more years. This report utilized standardized test scores (the California 
Standards Test and California High School Exit Exam) to compare the groups of schools. 
According to this study, over 60% of charter schools did not receive API growth scores, 
and 40% did not receive base scores. The only two comparison categories in this study 
were "all public schools" and "active charter schools," with the "active charter schools" 
separated into those open for more than five years and those open less than five years. As 
has been the case with most studies that compare student achievement in traditional 
public schools with student achievement in charter schools, selection bias could be a 
factor in this study and could possibly impact student performance. 
Since 1997, there have been eight Federal reports on charter schools issued by the 
U. S. Department of Education. These reports generally have concluded that charter 
schools are performing below traditional public schools. For example, in the 2004 
Evaluation of the Public Charter School Program, charter schools in five states cited in 
the report were less likely to meet the state performance standards than the traditional 
public schools. The reasons for the underperformance are unclear, however, and are not 
addressed in the report. 
Additionally, the American Federation of Teachers reported poor charter school 
performance in their 2004 Charter School Achievement on the 2003 National Assessment 
of Educational Progress. According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP), students in charter schools had lower achievement in grades four and eight 
compared to traditional public school students. Additionally, there were less charter 
school students performing at the "at or above Basic" and "at or above Proficient" levels 
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as compared to traditional public school peers. As with other studies, the two comparison 
categories were "charter" and "other public". Furthermore, the only measurement utilized 
was standardized test scores. 
In 2009, EdSource published a Performance Update on California charter schools. 
After adjusting for differences in student demographics, such as average parent 
education, special program participation (e.g., Free and Reduced Lunch, English 
Language Learner programs, and Special Education), and student ethnicity, three key 
conclusions were found: 
(a). Charter high school students scored moderately higher on standardized tests than 
their non-charter high school peers in English, but lower in math. 
(b). Charter middle school students outscored their non-charter school counterparts on 
standardized tests. 
(c). Students in charter elementary schools scored lower on standardized tests than 
students in non-charter elementary schools. 
Once again, the only measurement utilized was standardized test scores, and selection 
bias could contribute to students' performance on standardized tests. 
Current literature is often unclear as to how or to what degree charter schools are 
measured, and whether or not they are more successful than their traditional public school 
counterparts. Scarce are longitudinal studies that truly compare similar charter schools. 
Evidence as to whether or not charter schools cause increased academic achievement is 
limited. Additionally, new charter schools will challenge old ways of thinking, and will 
question current methods of learning and performance; charter schools introduce the 
possibility of evaluating schools using a different scale (Kolderie, 2005). 
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However, since the use of standardized tests to measure student achievement is so 
universally accepted and, more often than not, required, the following section will 
specifically discuss the use of standardized testing to determine student achievement in 
the charter school setting. 
Standardized testing. According to Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001), the majority 
of charter schools still use standardized tests as the primary means for measuring the 
success or failure of their programs. Lack of experience, expertise, and time, as well as 
state and federal mandates, cause charter school operators and teachers to fall back on 
assessments that are already in existence, even though those assessments may not 
accurately measure the student population a particular charter school is serving or the 
unique goals it is pursuing. A lack of proper growth measurement means that many 
charter schools lack precise operational goals against which their performance can be 
measured. To add to the ambiguity and confusion, the criteria for charter renewal have 
yet to be clearly specified in many states (Hess, 2001; Vegari, 1999). The data reported 
are very much dependent on who is providing the numbers. 
Some charters could conceivably meet the goals stated in their charters, but fail 
when measured solely by standardized test results. This conflict is explained by Manno: 
It's vital for a charter operator to recognize that items like state-wide tests are part 
of the accountability deal with the state and the charter authorizer. It is naive to 
design a curriculum that doesn't prepare students to do well on them. Conversely, 
the chartering authority must realize both on the testing side and when designing 
other forms of accountability monitoring, that if it wants some school to be truly 
different—especially if it wants them to serve at-risk youngsters—it has got to be 
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imaginative and sensitive in monitoring their performance. There is no simple 
solution to this dilemma, but a charter accountability compact should be clear 
about what's expected by the charter authorizer. (Manno, 1999. p. 429) 
Using standardized tests as a single indicator of charter school performance is 
flawed. Standardized tests are not completely accurate if used as an independent measure 
of success or failure, since these types of tests may not uniformly measure student 
performance or growth (Agostini, 2003). The problem is often compounded in that 
charter schools, by design, have their own idiosyncratic goals along with more 
conventionally accepted ones. 
Factors That Influence Student Achievement 
There are many factors that impact student achievement. This section will review 
school culture and the impact of autonomy as two key areas that the literature identifies 
as influences on the performance of students in charter schools. 
School culture. School culture includes a collection of the values, beliefs, and 
practices shared and exhibited by members of a school organization (Peterson & Deal, 
1998; Wagner, 2006). According to Paris (1998), the reality of reform is defined as 
creating a culture of belief—believing in one's goals and the ability to achieve them. 
Paris discusses the philosophies behind meeting the standards (i.e. academic 
achievement) and the creation of charter schools. According to Paris, freeing up 
professionals to implement innovative strategies will lead to real change. The author sees 
culture, not necessarily a particular instructional strategy or assessment, as critical. 
The idea of school culture is seen again in a 1999 study conducted by Wayson. 
Wayson suggests that the culture of traditional and charter schools, not the label of the 
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school, is a primary source of student achievement. The author notes the reasons for the 
creation of charter schools can be linked to global economic competition, low 
achievement, poor discipline, private schools' perceived superiority, and declining social 
values. Charter schools provide more choice for parents, and allow teachers to be more 
innovative and address student needs more appropriately. It is unclear, however, whether 
or not it is easier to achieve the culture the author describes in charter schools versus 
traditional public schools. 
Autonomy. Some would argue that autonomy is at the heart of charter school 
success and positive student achievement. A study conducted by Wohlstetter, Wenning, 
and Briggs (1995) focused on conditions that are necessary for charter schools to operate 
autonomously in order to enhance student achievement. The authors evaluated the charter 
school legislation and levels of autonomy attributed to charter schools in eleven states. 
Based on the authors' evaluation of the schools, and corresponding charter school law, 
autonomy is defined as the absence of constraints from external sources, but not complete 
freedom. The authors conclude that autonomy from higher levels of government, local 
autonomy (specifying own goals and programs and methods for achieving said goals), 
and consumer sovereignty all contribute to charter school success. 
In his book, The Charter School Challenge: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Fulfilling the 
Promise, Hassel (1999) maintains that "without autonomy, charter schools cannot 
provide unique educational options for children. They cannot serve as experimental 
laboratories or lighthouses from which other children can learn" (p. 78). The author's 
statement is inferred from his conclusions regarding existing charter school research. 
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Additionally, Stewart (2002) defines the link between charter school autonomy 
and student achievement: 
Charter schools allow educational designers the freedom to conceive and execute 
academic programs that must meet specific state standards and criteria but have 
extreme latitude in the design of methods to reach those standards. Thus, a charter 
school can be designed based on an educational model that is deemed by the 
designers to afford the best path for students toward achievement, (p.6) 
The author bases her conclusion on a single case study of a charter school in Houston. 
Although a case study can allow for detailed and often intimate findings, it is difficult to 
generalize the conclusions. 
Charter Schools' Impact on the Existing Educational System 
Charter school advocates and opponents alike are interested in whether or not 
charter schools have an impact on the current educational system. Adelman (2000) 
discusses the potential of charter schools to serve as labs for the rest of the educational 
community. Experiments, as Adelman states, do not necessarily succeed or fail; they 
prove or disprove current instructional practices, school structure, and educational 
philosophies. Charter schools are public schools, so the act of sharing successes and 
failures has the potential to improve the achievement of students in traditional public 
schools. 
There are barriers to the sort of sharing that Adelman alludes to, however. 
Common barriers associated with collaborative efforts between charter schools and 
traditional public schools include: scarcity of time and resources, type of charter school, 
and the charter granting agency. Also, there seems to be little collaboration between 
23 
leaders of traditional public schools and leaders of charter schools. Sometimes, there are 
even adversarial relationships that develop between the two. In a January 2010 interview 
on MSNBC's Morning Joe, the president of the American Federation of Teachers 
commented on the strained relationship between traditional schools and charter schools in 
the state of New York. The problem, she summarized, is that the system needs to ensure 
that charter schools are "taking the same kids as all other public schools." 
O'Sullivan, Nagle, and Spence (2000) conducted surveys of districts and charter 
schools in North Carolina to find the impact of charter schools on their local school 
districts in the first year of charter school existence in that state. Thirty-four charter 
schools and their twenty-four districts were included. Most districts and their charter 
schools viewed their relationships as fair or good. Charter school directors saw their 
schools as instruments of change for their districts. Districts viewed charter schools as 
having serious financial implications. Districts and charter school personnel saw charters 
as increasing the number of schools of choice and enhancing district public relations 
efforts. In conclusion, the perceived impact of charter schools varied: charter school 
employees viewed their impact as positive, while district employees saw charter school's 
impact primarily as that of a financial burden. 
A comparative study of Colorado teachers found that charter school teachers and 
traditional public school teachers are more alike than they are different (Bomotti, 
Ginsber, and Cobb, 2000). The fact that teachers in both settings are more similar than 
different suggests that charter schools have not excelled in areas of innovation or positive 
impact as initially envisioned; consequently, the authors conclude that they do not have 
the sort of positive impact as initially envisioned. In contrast, Rofes (1998) established 
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that the cultures and climates of nearby traditional public schools almost always changed 
when a new charter school came into the community, but these changes were not 
predictable. 
Results of a study conducted by Bohte (2004) demonstrated that charter schools 
contribute to modest overall performance improvements for students enrolled in 
traditional public schools. Charter schools help bring about stronger performance gains 
for low-income students enrolled in traditional public schools. Bohte's argument is that 
charter schools create a market-like environment that offer parents and students the 
ability to leave under-performing schools and attend more innovative and less 
bureaucratic educational settings. Bohte believes that charter schools may promote 
systemic improvements in public education. Conversely, data from a 2002 study by 
Howe and Betebenner indicated that school choice had not resulted in improved 
achievement in the district. 
Russo and Massucci (1999) found five reasons to support the finding that charter 
school laws have less impact on large urban districts than in other areas. Most urban 
districts experience increasing school-aged populations, most large urban districts contain 
only a few charter schools, more time is needed to study charter school law since most 
urban charter schools have existed for approximately ten years, urban charter schools are 
difficult to reform because of their size, and some urban districts viewed charter schools 
as a distraction. A 2005 study by Gregg Vanourek suggested that charter schools have yet 
to demonstrate significant impact on the traditional public schools in their areas and/or 
districts. 
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Problems with Charter Schools and Reasons for Failure 
The development and maintenance of a charter school can be an arduous process 
which must balance curriculum, finances, marketing, and the daily maintenance of an 
organization which affects so many children's lives (Nathan, 1996). Along with the 
growth and responsibility of developing and maintaining a charter school comes the 
unavoidable need for some charter schools to close. 
Closures 
This section of the literature review discusses the current number of charter 
school closures, as well as the legal reasons for the closures, and areas of need for charter 
schools. 
Number of closures. As of February 2010, the Center for Educational Reform 
reported that six hundred fifty seven charter schools have closed across the nation since 
1992. This number represents over twelve percent of all charters ever opened. 
Although specific numbers seem to vary, according to the Center for Education 
Reform web site (2010), of the more than nine hundred and fifty charter schools that have 
opened since California enacted charter school law in 1992, over one hundred schools (or 
about eleven percent) have closed. Ninety-five percent of closures occur within five 
years. 
Legal reasons for closures. As of 2001, most charter school closures nationwide 
were due to fiscal, administrative, or ethical violations, but few had been closed due to 
under-performance (Griffin & Wohlstetter, 2001). A 2002 study by the Center for 
Education Reform (CER) found that out of one hundred ninety-four charter school 
closures, nine percent were due to facility issues. Of the eighty-four that never opened 
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after receiving their charter, twenty-seven percent were due to facility issues (for 
example, failure to secure a physical location or inadequate space). Since various centers 
and research groups report "closures" differently, there are major discrepancies in the 
research as to how many charter schools have closed, what types of charter schools have 
closed, and for what reasons. Manno has reported that, since charter schools first opened, 
more than two hundred failed (or failing) schools have been closed on fiscal, educational, 
and organizational grounds (2002). 
In 2009, the National Charter Schools Institute published a report by Dr. Brian L. 
Carpenter regarding charter schools that had closed through 2007. Carpenter focused his 
study on charter school authorizers. Out of a pool of 878 agencies which authorized 
charter schools across the nation, 454 responded to his request for information. Of those 
454 agencies, 83 stated that they had closed at least one charter school. Interviews were 
conducted with 52% of those 83 agencies, which represented 100 closed charter schools 
in nineteen states. This study suggested the following "lessons" we should learn from 
charter schools that had closed: 
(a). Insufficient enrollment is the reason most charters closed. 
(b). Sloppy governance was prevalent in schools that closed. 
(c). When non-renewal occurred, academic underperformance was the most common 
reason. 
(d). On average, most dissolved charter schools operated less than five years. 
(e). More than a fifth of failed schools mismanaged their financial affairs (Carpenter, 
2009). 
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This study did not include some large states (e.g., Arizona) that have a significant number 
of charter schools. Also, as mentioned earlier, this study focused on the perspectives of 
charter school authorizers. Charter school authorizers may or may not have a true 
understanding of the day-to-day activities and procedures that occur at the school once 
the charter has been authorized. Authorizers may want to see academic growth after a 
three or five year renewal period, but beyond that, there is variation in their level of 
involvement on the front lines of charter school operation. 
Carpenter also offered suggestions after each "lesson" that was learned. The issue 
with those suggestions, however, is that they were intended for three groups: charter 
boards/executives, state associations, and authorizers. There was no mention of 
suggestions for those who dealt with the operation of the charter schools on a consistent 
and regular basis. Since "executives" are in the same suggestion category as "charter 
boards", it is unclear whether executives include personnel such as the directors, 
administrators, or principals. 
Areas of Need 
A study done by Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001) utilized focus groups that were 
comprised of charter school directors/founders, administration, and teachers from Boston, 
Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. Among other things, the focus groups revealed that there 
were some difficulties associated with developing coherent instructional programs. These 
difficulties were caused by vague school missions and the pressure to create something 
quickly within a short timeframe. Accountability systems were usually created internally, 
and consequences for poor student performance from one district to another were 
inconsistent. Finally, this study uncovered that many charter school leaders exhibited a 
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rebellious attitude, which typically stemmed from challenging the status quo while inside 
the traditional public school system. 
In a significant finding in their research, Griffin and Wohlstetter discovered the 
following: 
The ability of charter school leaders to create an effective balance oftentimes 
appeared to be hampered by their lack of professional knowledge and experience 
in the management area. Few charter school leaders had a strong professional 
understanding of participative management or high-involvement organizations, 
further complicating attempts to establish a decentralized system that also was 
effective, (p. 355) 
Three general areas of need surrounding charter schools were revealed in the 
above-mentioned study: developing an instructional/curricular program, developing a 
meaningful accountability system, and developing school management/leadership 
processes. Although these areas were identified, little was mentioned in terms of specific 
solutions or recommendations to avoid or improve upon areas of need. Additionally, the 
participants in the focus groups had perspectives that came from their involvement in 
large, urban school districts. 
Manno and Finn (1998) conducted a two-year research project which found many 
unique problems with charter schools that made it through their first year. These 
problems included: meager facilities that place stress on the program and frustrate people, 
signs of burnout, low first year test scores, and pressure to add more than neighboring 
traditional schools. Again, no attempt was made to offer recommendations or suggestions 
for how these problems may be solved or minimized. In later research, Finn (2002) adds: 
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Schools turn out to be exceedingly complex organizations that must juggle myriad 
competing pressures. Starting such an institution from scratch is truly daunting. 
The political compromises that nearly every state has made in its charter law 
mean that founding a successful charter school entails finding or building a 
facility, making do with partial funding, and enduring a lot of red tape. (p.93) 
A 2002 review by Manno suggests that charter schools face a list of issues that 
impact their ability to function and maintain their operations, including: local opposition, 
interest group attacks, and enemies from within. Manno stresses the need for more local 
and national charter organizations that allow charter school operators, staff, parents, and 
students to network, become more knowledgeable, and advocate for themselves. 
A 1998 UCLA charter school study, conducted by principal investigator Amy 
Stuart Wells, found that issues surrounding charter schools also included: not being held 
accountable for academic achievement, need for private resources in order to survive, and 
dependency on strong, well-connected leaders. 
Cobb and Suarez (2000) found that issues faced by North Carolina charter schools 
also included the need for leaders that had more entrepreneurial and interpersonal skills. 
This study additionally cited the need to increase salaries in order to attract more 
experienced, credentialed teachers. It is unclear whether or not those involved in the 
charter schools would have made the same recommendations as the authors. 
Malloy (2000) conducted a case study on a charter high school in North Carolina. 
Difficulties included implementing instructional strategies that matched the vision of the 
charter. Another secondary charter school was studied by Passe (2000). The author's 
conclusion was that in order to overcome extraordinary barriers, charters must be 
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exceptional in the following areas: cooperation with their school system, leadership, 
resources, teachers, and curriculum. Areas that the author viewed as needing 
improvement included: effective and experienced leadership, properly trained teachers 
who can effectively teach at-risk students, more innovative instructional strategies that 
addressed students' needs, and curriculum appropriate for students' learning abilities. 
Again, how charter schools are to approach these issues remains unclear. 
Conclusion 
The common thread which ties all of the literature together is that the research has 
been done within the context of charter schools that currently exist, or existed at the time 
of the study. Any failures that are noted in this literature are shortcomings of charter 
schools that are still operational. There is a need to examine the implications of charters 
that have closed, interview those involved in the closure, and learn from their unfortunate 
failure as a way to improve the charter school movement. 
With some exceptions, current research has emphasized the effectiveness of 
charter schools. Unfortunately, there is a lack of published research that discusses a) 
which types of charter schools have closed, and b) what advice those involved desire to 
give to others who want to embark on their own charter school journey. There is also a 
need to know what skills, experiences, structures, and supports were lacking in charter 
schools that were forced to close their doors. A proactive approach needs to be taken in 
the development and sustainability of charter schools, not only for the sake of the 
students whose families have chosen to enroll their children in charter schools, but also 
for the growth of our educational system. As part of his interview with The Plain Dealer 
31 
(Ohio) in March of 2009, President Barack Obama encapsulated the importance of the 
existence of accountable charter schools: 
We've got to experiment with ways to provide a better education experience for 
our kids, and some charters are doing outstanding jobs. So the bottom line is to try 
to create innovation within the public school system that can potentially be scaled 
up, but also to make sure that we are maintaining very high standards for any 
charter school that's created. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Although there have been several efforts to list California charter schools that 
have closed, as well as document the officially articulated reasons for their closures 
(California Department of Education, 2006; The Center for Educational Reform, 2009; 
Manno, Finn, and Vanourek, 2000), there has been little, if any, attempt to find 
underlying causes of the closures. A significant amount of knowledge resides in the 
administrators and directors of these closed charter schools. 
This chapter first summarizes the initial research design which intended to utilize 
document analysis, quantitative survey results, and qualitative interviews. Second, the 
implementation difficulties with the quantitative surveys are addressed, along with the 
need for a shift in the initial research design. Third, a description of the qualitative 
procedures that became the primary data source for the two newly designed research 
questions are discussed. Fourth, the data analysis procedures for the two new research 
questions are outlined. Finally, the delimitations and limitations of the study are 
reviewed. 
Initial Research Design 
Initially, this study attempted to employ both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods to query former administrators as to the underlying reasons for their schools' 
closures. At the onset of the study, the methods that were scheduled to be used included 
document analysis, the distribution of a largely quantitative survey, and qualitative 
interviewing. 
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Rationale for Participant Selection 
Administrators were chosen as the focus of this study over other personnel (such 
as teachers and other charter employees), parents, or community members because of the 
direct and influential role that charter school administrators/directors held during their 
tenure in a charter school. According to a finding in a 1998 UCLA Charter School Study 
led by Amy Stuart Wells, charter schools depend on leaders who are powerful and have 
influential connections. According to the same study, it is common for charter school 
administrators or directors to have been directly involved in the chartering process of 
their school, which would provide them with a valuable perspective in understanding the 
circumstances surrounding the school's closure. Some of the respondents did assist in 
developing their charter schools and writing the charter proposals; others were hired 
shortly after the charters had been approved by the sponsoring district or county office of 
education. 
Additionally, administrators were good candidates for this study because of the 
practical need for one point-of-contact for a school that has already been closed and 
because the point-of-contact selected should be comparable from site to site. As a former 
charter school administrator, I also believe that administrators have the opportunity to 
observe a wide range of perspectives at their school sites, including the viewpoints of 
parents, teachers, students, and the chartering agency, which makes their knowledge 
valuable and diverse. 
Administrators of schools labeled as "abandoned," "inactive," or "withdrawn" 
were not contacted because these schools (or potential schools): a) were vacated without 
formal closure procedures, b) had charters that were approved, but did not secure a 
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student population due to an issue such as a lack of facility, or c) had approved charters, 
or charters that were in the approval process, but were withdrawn from the process by the 
submitter(s). These types of schools were not categorized under the four legal reasons 
listed in California Charter School Law, which include: a) violation of the standards set 
forth in the school's charter, b) fiscal mismanagement, c) failure to meet outcomes for 
student achievement specified in school's charter, or d) violation of any provision of law 
(California Education Code Section 47607(c)). Therefore, these three types of categories 
for failed charter schools did not fit the criterion established for the study. 
Document Analysis 
Miller (1997), as cited in Patton (2002), argues that documents are "socially 
constructed realities that warrant study in their own right" (p. 498). The analysis of 
documents provided information to determine the official, legal reason why the school 
was not given charter renewal or was revoked. Written rationale for the closure of the 
school provided me with some of the historical and contextual information I needed in 
order to proceed with, and attempt to triangulate, the qualitative interviews. Since this 
piece of data collection was utilized in order to answer the revised research questions, a 
more detailed discussion of document analysis will occur later in the chapter. 
Locating Survey Participants 
I initially attempted to contact the entire population of approximately one hundred 
thirty-nine former California charter school administrators/directors (through the 
2004/2005 school year) via email to complete a twenty question survey (See Appendix 
B) regarding their experiences with a charter school closure or revocation. For the 
purposes of this study, administrators were those that held the title of "director," 
35 
"principal," or other title that signaled that they were the formal leader of the school. 
Since there is some discrepancy among available lists of closed and revoked charters, my 
primary source for locating administrators was through the list generated by the 
California Department of Education (CDE) Web site. 
Survey Design 
A survey was initially used to gather a portion of the data for this study. A twenty 
question self-administered survey was developed that generated ideas regarding the 
relationships that charter administrators had with their personnel and their chartering 
agency, as well as information regarding their preparedness, or lack thereof, for leading a 
charter school. An online survey program (Survey Monkey) was utilized in order to allow 
easy access and clear design for those participating in this research study. 
Qualitative Interview Design 
The study moved from a mixed-methodology structure to an almost exclusively 
qualitative one (the limited survey data that I was able to gather were used to identify 
interviewees and also to help triangulate interview data); therefore, the primary method 
of data collection became qualitative interviews. The qualitative interview design that 
was used merits its own section, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
Implementation Processes and Difficulties 
Unfortunately, I was unable to fully execute the methods intended to be used in 
the initial design of the study. Issues that arose with document analysis are discussed 
below, even though I was still able to use outside sources to triangulate some interview 




Document analysis did provide information regarding documented legal reasons 
for charter school closures. A closure list from a 2009 report by The Center for 
Educational Reform documents official reasons for some charter school closures. Missing 
or more recent closure information was provided by board minutes from the sponsoring 
district or county office of education, or closure lists available through the California 
Department of Education. Newspaper articles also served to triangulate data. Documents 
were located on the Internet, and phone calls and e-mail correspondence (primarily with 
county offices of education and school districts) were used to locate additional 
information. 
There are, however, some discrepancies and inaccuracies in the documents that 
list charter school closures which made it difficult to locate consistent information. For 
example, two schools that had not been labeled solely as a home school/independent 
study program became the focus of qualitative interviews. I was unaware of the nature of 
the schools (which were more of a "hybrid" model: partially a home school program and 
partially an on-site program) until I conducted the qualitative interviews. Although I 
chose to include those two schools because of the valuable information generated through 
the interview, the confusion could have been avoided had the charter school closure lists 
been more accurate and reliable. 
Surveys 
Surveys were designed with the intent to collect former charter school 
administrators' opinions regarding the closures of the schools, but there were significant 
problems with this component of the study's original design. 
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An introductory letter accompanied each e-mail request for participation in the 
study (See Appendix A). Surveys were sent out multiple times, and many e-mail 
addresses were no longer valid. Internet searches were used to try to locate potential 
respondents, but the further back a school had closed, the more difficult it became to 
locate certain individuals. Contacting districts to locate individuals also proved to be 
futile. As district personnel changed, connections to past schools and former 
administrators became more removed and often were non-existent. 
I was only able to secure responses from fourteen percent of this sample, which 
produced ungeneralizable data. The small response rate did not lend itself to any 
significant data analysis; therefore, the results of the surveys are not presented within the 
framework of this study. There may be mention of survey responses, however, within the 
context of each individual qualitative case study if the information is relevant and 
enhances the data generated from the qualitative interviews. 
Although not enough data were generated through survey responses to fulfill the 
initial quantitative portion of this study, the information obtained from the surveys helped 
to establish relevant and meaningful background information for the qualitative 
interviews. Those surveys that were returned did play a key role in locating and securing 
qualitative interview participants. 
I attempted to contact twelve of the twenty survey respondents for a qualitative 
interview based on their expressed interest in further participation in the study. One 
survey respondent expressed interest in being contacted, but did not return phone calls; 
another respondent did not return emails; a third gave an inaccurate phone number. In 
total, nine interviews were conducted. 
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Research Questions 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this research study initially contained the following 
research questions: 
5) Using the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999) typology, which types of 
California charter schools have closed? 
6) What are the reasons for the school closure? 
a) What was the official legal reason for closure? 
b) What reasons do administrators give for the school closing? 
7) In retrospect, what, if anything, do the administrators of closed charter schools 
believe could have been done (through training, education, or other means) to 
prevent the school from closing? 
8) What information do the administrators feel would be helpful to those wanting to 
open charter schools in the future? 
Due to the lack of data generated through the quantitative surveys, this study now focuses 
solely on the following research questions: 
3) What are the reasons former charter school leaders give for the closure of their 
schools? 
4) What advice do these former charter school leaders offer to those who are 
interested in starting or continuing a charter school? 
Qualitative Interview Procedures 
Due to the evolution of this study to a purely qualitative research design, the 
qualitative interviews have become the cornerstone of the data collection and analysis. 
The information gathered from these interviews generated the heartiest and most 
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meaningful data, which gave a contextually grounded description of the opinions and 
advice of former charter school administrators. The interview data described both former 
charter school directors' perceptions of the schools they had attempted to lead, why the 
contexts they once led no longer exist, and the lessons they learned and can pass on to 
others wishing to start and/or lead a charter school. 
The primary method of data collection used in this study was topical interviewing, 
which is interviewing that focuses more on a program, issue, or process than on people's 
lives (Glesne, 1999). In other words, I was not concerned whether or not the 
interviewees' actions or inactions personally contributed to the closure of the schools, 
although it is quite possible that the formal leader may have contributed, directly or 
indirectly, to the closure. Instead, my interest focused on perceptions about the reasons 
regarding why the schools closed, and, more importantly, the interviewees' opinions of 
what could have prevented the closures, as well as what advice they had for those 
wanting to open charter schools in the future. 
Preliminary Study 
A preliminary study was conducted to explore why one particular California 
charter school was closed and what those involved felt could have been done to prevent 
the closure. This study suggested that there was a potential to gather interesting 
information about charter schools that have closed. This sort of information would not be 
found in simple lists that give us names of schools and the legal reasons for closure. 
Two interviews were conducted in my preliminary study to gather information on 
a charter school in California that closed in 2003. Since the school had no formal 
"principal" as a contact, I interviewed two people: the charter school liaison employed by 
40 
the local school district, whose responsibility included "keeping track" of the school's 
progress, and the business administrator employed by the charter school. Although the 
qualitative data from the preliminary study provided interesting results, the type of 
participant changed for the purposes of this dissertation study, as described earlier in this 
chapter. 
The results of the preliminary study suggested that answers to both the knowledge 
and opinion questions present in the interview guide could be obtained within a forty-five 
to sixty minute time frame. Some interviews that transpired as part of the actual 
dissertation study lasted two hours. The preliminary study also suggested that there may 
be a distinct difference between the legal reason for one charter school's closure and the 
reasons given by administration and other personnel, which seemed to be the 
circumstance in many of the case studies profiled in this dissertation study. 
Protocol for Qualitative Interviews 
Purpose and use of the interview guide. Interviews conducted as part of this 
study employed an interview guide. Patton (2002) describes an interview guide as a "list 
of questions or issues that are to be explored in the course of an interview. An interview 
guide is prepared to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each 
person interviewed" (p. 343). By utilizing this method of interviewing, I was able to 
discover the causes for the closure of the charter schools while exploring other questions 
by using probes that were designed to prompt the interviewee to clarify and explain both 
the knowledge and opinions he or she is providing (Patton, 2002). 
The interview guide strategy can also be seen in terms of a continuum which 
ranges from conversational to structured. Patton (2002) clarifies this point by stating that 
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"the interviewer remains free to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to 
word questions spontaneously, and to establish a conversational style but with the focus 
on a particular subject that has been predetermined" (p. 343). The majority of the 
interviews in this study were conversational in nature and required some probing 
questions. 
Procedures before the interviews. The location and time for the interview was 
established by the interviewee and me, with emphasis on convenience for the 
interviewee. Interview locations ranged from the interviewee's home, to local coffee 
shops, to current work sites, to one phone interview. Once the interviewee was chosen 
and verbally agreed to be interviewed, I went over the informed consent form with them 
and ask them to sign it (See Appendix C). All agreed and signed the informed consent 
form. 
Procedures during the interviews. I began by granting each interviewee the 
chance to visually represent his or her experiences by completing a timeline. I explained 
to each interviewee that he or she could highlight major events that led up to, and 
possibly contributed to, the closure of the charter school. None of the interviewees chose 
to complete a timeline. Most were eager to tell their story and began sharing information 
before any formal questions were asked. 
Each interviewee had the opportunity to tell me about his or her experiences with 
their charter school (see Appendix D). These initial conversations reflected Spradley's 
(1979) "grand tour questions," which give respondents the opportunity to verbally take 
the interviewer through a place, a time period, or a sequence of events or activities 
(Glesne, 1999). Knowledge questions, as described by Patton (2002), allowed me to 
42 
understand how informed the interviewees were about their particular charter school 
closure, not charter school closures in general. The answers to the opinion questions 
assisted me in understanding what the respondents thought about some experience or 
issue (Patton, 2002), in particular, the closure of their school. 
Interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The one telephone 
interview was held on a speaker phone, audio-recorded, and transcribed as well. Field 
notes were taken in order to recall physical and environmental occurrences throughout 
the interview. As noted by Patton (2002), field notes help to clarify information or devise 
new questions, assist in finding quotes in later data analysis, ensure that the interviews 
are moving in a desirable direction, and they are useful for back-up in case the tape 
recorder fails. 
As a token of appreciation and an acknowledgement of the value of the 
respondent's time, the nine individuals who participated in the interview process each 
received a twenty-five dollar gift card to Barnes and Noble bookstore. 
Procedures immediately following the interviews. After each interview, I 
"compared the data actually obtained in the interview to the data desired as specified in 
the guide in order to begin planning for the next interview" (Patton, 2002, p. 421) by 
answering the following questions in my field notes: 
Where did the interview occur? Under what conditions? How did the interviewee 
react to questions? How well do I think I did asking questions? How was the 
rapport? Did I find out what I really wanted to find out in the interview? If not, 
what was the problem? (Patton, 2002, p. 384) 
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I also personally transcribed each interview as close to the time of the actual interview as 
possible. 
Triangulation 
The qualitative interviews became much more expansive in terms of generating 
information than previously intended at the onset of the study. The interviews were 
initially intended to be secondary to the quantitative survey results. Because of the 
original design of the study, there was no plan to triangulate the qualitative data produced 
by the former administrators' interviews with additional qualitative interviews conducted 
with additional people familiar with the schools' closures, such as parents, teachers, or 
other pertinent individuals associated with the schools. Therefore, there was no within-
case triangulation. There was, however, some additional data support collected through 
document analysis. The survey responses given by the interviewees prior to the 
interviews also allowed for analysis of consistencies, or inconsistencies, between their 
survey responses and interview responses. Additionally, there were some interesting 
shared themes that developed through cross-case analysis that reflected strong 
commonalities across the closures that were documented in this study. 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the qualitative data is organized around the two newly developed 
research questions. 
Research Question One: What Are the Reasons Former Charter School Leaders 
Give For the Closure of Their Schools? 
As was noted in the discussion of data collection procedures, the legal reasons for 
closure were secured through the use of a list compiled in 2009 by the Center for 
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Education Reform (CER). This is the primary document in finding official charter school 
closure information since the organization is credible and the charter school closure 
information is well-organized. The current California Department of Education (CDE) 
web site (or direct contact of CDE) served to supplement any missing information from 
the CER report. 
The interview data were coded based on the interview questions. Interview 
transcripts and corresponding field notes were read through and initial coding took place 
based on themes that emerged from the data. Subsequent analysis of the data identified an 
emergence of themes that occurred consistently, as well as compelling ideas that may 
have been established in only one case study. Although the interview data were not 
linked to attempt to create cause and effect relationships, I searched for commonalities by 
using the same codes and looking for similar themes across all of the interviews. 
As mentioned above, instead of trying to find cause and effect relationships 
within each interview, I looked for a holistic picture that assisted in understanding a 
charter school closure within a specific context (Patton, 2002). The specific context is 
reflected in each set of interview data representing a closed charter school. 
The findings are presented through nine individual case studies and cross-case 
analysis. Each interview was coded based on the interview questions and themes that 
emerge through the interpretation and analysis of the interview responses. The 
interviewees' responses are integrated into matrices that allow the comparison of answers 
for each of the interview questions. My hope is that I have developed a clearer, holistic 
picture of why some charter schools in California have closed, while understanding the 
essential nature of a particular set of charter schools in a specific context (Patton, 2002). 
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Research Question Two: What Advice Do These Former Charter School Leaders 
Offer to Those Who Are Interested in Starting or Continuing a Charter School? 
The second research question was addressed through qualitative conversational 
interviews with questions outlined in the interview guide (See Appendix C). Although 
opinion items were present in the survey, and inquired as to whether or not respondents 
felt they had opinions and/or advice to share, richer and more meaningful data for these 
specific interview questions were obtained through the qualitative interview process. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, similarities and differences among administrators' responses 
were analyzed using initial coding of each interview and the uncovering of the 
development of themes in the data. After several readings of the interview data, formal 
themes emerged both within each interview and among the interviews. The techniques of 
description (staying close to data as originally recorded) and analysis (identifying key 
factors in the study and relationships among them) were implemented (Glesne, 1999). 
Therefore, the interviews were compared for commonalities and differences, and each 
administrator's opinions and advice were shared in both narrative format and through the 
cross-case analysis matrices format described above. 
Delimitations of the Study 
As stated previously, this study did not include charter schools labeled as 
"withdrawn," "abandoned," or "inactive" by the California Department of Education. 
This is due to the fact that these schools were not closed for the three legal reasons for 
closure or revocation as stated in the California Charter School Law, and this study 
specifically targets schools that have been closed or revoked after charter status had been 
granted. 
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This study also did not include those charter schools that were labeled as "home 
school/independent study", although two schools were miscategorized within closure 
documents, and I did not clearly understand their hybrid nature until the qualitative 
interviews occurred. The purpose of this research was to focus on charter schools that 
were more traditional in nature; meaning, schools that looked, from the outside and 
within their structure, more like traditional public schools. That said, the interviews of the 
administrators of the "hybrid" schools did offer valuable information. 
Limitations of the Study 
One obvious limitation to this study that has already been discussed at length was 
the flaws and failure of the quantitative survey design. There simply was not enough 
reliable information available to successfully contact former charter school leaders 
regarding their experiences with the closure of their charter school. Although I did 
receive twenty responses to the surveys, that was not enough to warrant separate 
discussion in this dissertation. 
Initially, the research design was primarily based on quantitative survey 
responses, with a secondary emphasis on the qualitative interviews. The interviews were 
initially intended to triangulate the survey data, along with document analysis. Since the 
response rate was so low and the quantitative data were not valid, I made a good-faith 
attempt at triangulating the interview data with as many outside resources as possible, 
although I was not able to conduct any additional interviews for each case study. 
This study was limited to administrators of California charter schools that have 
closed or have been revoked. Valuable information could also be obtained by 
interviewing or accessing information from teachers, parents, students, charter sponsors, 
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and others involved with the closure of a charter school. Additionally, because of the 
unique demographics, geographic location, and infrastructure of California, beneficial 
information could be gathered by studying charter school closures and revocations in 
other states. 
There are schools other than charter schools that have been forced to close. Public 
schools are closed for various reasons, and under No Child Left Behind, it is certain that 
more schools will close or convert to charter school status in the future. Private schools 
are also sometimes forced to close their doors. This study clearly limited itself to the area 
of closed and revoked charter schools. Other schools that have closed may also have their 
own distinct stories to tell. 
Self-report bias may have occurred when interviewing former charter school 
leaders. Given that there is evidence to suggest that the principal (or person in a similar 
position) is one of the most influential forces in a charter school, the 
principals/administrators that participated in this study quite possibly did not fully or 
accurately report their roles—which could have been significant—in the closure of their 
own charter school. In fact, the participants may not have fully understood themselves the 
impact they may have had on their school's closure. 
Finally, researcher bias was identified as a potential issue that might impact the 
study. Since I have only worked in successful charter schools, both as a teacher and 
administrator, I had to put aside my opinions and experiences so that I could learn the 
important lessons shared by those who have worked in unsuccessful charter schools. 
The following chapter includes nine case studies which were developed after nine 
separate qualitative interviews. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the study's findings that were generated 
through qualitative interviews triangulated with data from relevant document analysis and 
the interviewees' responses to the survey questions. For reasons explained in the previous 
chapter, the qualitative interview data turned out to be most significant in this study. 
Hence, the data from each qualitative interview are presented in individual case study 
format. The interview data are presented in randomly-selected order. All of the data are 
then used in the following chapter as part of a cross-case analysis organized around the 
study's research questions. 
The Case Studies 
Case Study One: "I Was the Charter School" 
Sitting in an independent, local coffee shop outside of a major California city, I 
found myself scanning the faces wondering who I would be interviewing. It was a few 
minutes past our meeting time, and I wore a name badge so that I could be easily 
identified. Finally the interviewee's eyes caught my name and we approached each other. 
After ordering coffee and finding a suitable spot, I asked the interviewee, "Do you want 
to draw out a timeline of your involvement with the charter school?" The interviewee 
answered very matter-of-factly, "I was the charter school." 
As she had indicated in her responses to the online survey, this interviewee had 
been a school administrator for less than three years prior to directing the charter school. 
The interviewee also stated that she possessed a teaching credential, an administrative 
credential, and a doctoral degree. 
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The beginning. This charter school, which interview and survey response data 
suggest should be classified as a Type A charter school (urban/ethnocentric/grassroots) 
using the typology of charter school categories described in Chapter Two, started out as a 
result of the denial of a petition to a large urban district to be a "new small autonomous 
school" (a classification for schools within the district that were granted more freedom to 
be self-regulated within the district than their district counterpart schools were typically 
granted.). After the petition was denied, a school board member suggested that the 
petitioner (the interviewee) look into becoming a charter school. The interviewee 
attended a charter school workshop and, although the information presented at the 
workshop seemed overwhelming, the interviewee was convinced that the charter option 
represented the best strategy for establishing the school she envisioned. 
This school started out with an emphasis in constructivism (allowing students' 
own problems and questions to guide instruction, building on students' strengths and 
interests) and dual immersion. Dual immersion is a bilingual program that essentially 
combines native and non-native speakers of two languages to teach both languages 
simultaneously through academic content and social interaction; the goal is to help 
students to develop fluency in two languages, their first language and a second language. 
The initial concept also included having half Latino and half African-American students 
so that the two cultural groups could learn from each other. According to the petitioner, 
"We cared about everything. We cared about what food they ate, what snacks they 
brought, where we got our lunches. We really wanted the place to be as beautiful as 
possible and that cost us a lot of money." 
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The interviewee mentioned that the first version of the charter, which was initially 
for the autonomous small school concept, was "awful and got rejected for very good 
reasons." The petition was rewritten primarily by the interviewee for consideration for 
charter school status, and was approved in the spring of 2001. The school opened in the 
fall of 2002 with 65 students. 
At the end of the first year of operation, test scores were very low (according to 
what the interviewee was told, the lowest in the district); the school had an Academic 
Performance Index, or API (a numeric index ranging from 200-1000 that indicates the 
academic performance of a school) of 464 in 2004 with fifty students tested. By 2006, the 
school had an API of 540 with one hundred three students tested (California Department 
of Education charter school database). The interviewee had been "fighting the tests for 
decades and just did not want that to be the focus of the school." Even the interviewee 
admitted that the decision to, in essence, ignore test until they had to be given —to fail to 
do any preparation to take them or be sure the school's curricular content was aligned 
with test content— might have been a bit too idealistic. 
The downfall. The interviewee admitted that the school was not doing as much 
bilingual education or constructivism as promised, and as stated earlier, student test 
scores were low. The interviewee said, "They [district officials] don't care about 
constructivism. They don't care about bilingual education, so they were phony-baloneys. 
The test scores they did care about." 
During the school's years of operation, the interviewee was very critical of the 
local school district superintendent, both privately and through interviews she granted to 
local newspapers. This interviewee believed the school's charter was revoked after four 
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years due to her negative relationship with the district's superintendent and her outspoken 
criticism of the sponsoring district. The interviewee stated that the superintendent used 
the school's low test scores as an opportunity to "take revenge." 
The storyline about the reasons for the school's closing that the interviewee 
outlined during the interview was consistent with her response to the open-ended survey 
question: "Please list any reasons other than those offered above as possible contributing 
factors to your charter school's closure." The interviewee's response to this survey 
question was as follows: 
We were closed because I was an outspoken critic of the district administrator. 
The excuse was low test scores, which went up our last year because we did all 
the cynical things (no teaching, just test prep, opted out our most confused kids, 
etc.). It is a tragedy for the neighborhood, because we stabilized our corner of the 
worst part of [our city]. Now it's an empty lot again. 
According to the sponsoring school district's Board of Education minutes 
dated March 2006, the charter was revoked "given the lack of progress made by the 
school i.e., the test scores are sixty points below any other school in this district. It is not 
clear which of the standards are being taught through the project based learning process." 
The motion was made, seconded, and carried by three board members. (Two of the five 
board members were absent). The Center for Education Reform (2009) also cites 
"academic" as the reason for closure, with the following explanation: "some of the lowest 
test scores in the district and students were not making adequate academic progress." 
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The former director spent the spring of 2006 attempting to appeal the revocation. 
The interviewee also attempted to find another sponsor to take over the school, but no 
organization wanted to take on the work of accepting this charter school. 
What could have been done differently. An obvious variance that might have 
led to a different outcome would have been improved test scores, though the director 
made it clear to me that the school did not want to emphasize test preparation in day-to-
day programming. The director also thought that the school could have used more staff 
that were bilingual, culturally diverse, and trained in constructivist education. In addition, 
the director believed that, if given the opportunity to make a case for the school in front 
of the school board, the school would have "won" and the school's charter would not 
have been revoked. The director believed that the decision to revoke the charter was 
made independent of the board and was done at the sole discretion of the superintendent. 
The board members who voted to close the school, from the interviewee's perspective, 
simply rubber-stamped the superintendent's decision. (Whether or not this analysis of 
board involvement is correct is another question entirely, one that this study, given its 
research design, could not answer). 
To encourage the interviewee to elaborate on her response, I asked, "What would 
you have said to them [the school board]?" The interviewee's response was as follows: 
We were doing things that had never been done before. We were giving poor kids 
of color a kind of prep school education. The kind of education that the kids in the 
hills get and within a couple of years our test scores would have probably gone 
up. 
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To the extent that the interviewee's analysis of what prompted the school's 
closing—i.e., that low test scores were simply the public reason given for the real 
reason—was at least somewhat correct, the beginning of the end probably came when the 
director accused the superintendent of sitting on one hundred eighty thousand dollars in 
state grant money intended for the charter school. In the spring of 2003, the director was 
told at a meeting that the money would not be available for another week, so the director 
went downstairs to the superintendent's office to ask for the money. The director was told 
by the superintendent's "body guard" (the interviewee's characterization) that he was not 
available and would not be willing to discuss the issue anytime in the near future. A few 
days later, the director received a letter from the superintendent's office stating that the 
director would not be allowed back in the building for a month. 
The director then went to the local newspaper which wrote a story from the 
director's perspective, and that story, in the interviewee's account, at least, is what sealed 
the fate of this charter school. This article (source removed for confidentiality) supported 
the claim that the director was banned from school district headquarters (for 30 days) 
after arguing with the former bodyguard for the superintendent. Also, the article stated 
that this was the first time in this particular district's history that a charter school had 
been revoked due to academic reasons. 
Advice for others. This director's first piece of advice was to start with a lot of 
money. ("A million's about right.") The director indicated that a hefty budget was needed 
"to do whatever it takes to get very poor kids who start out five years behind to catch up 
with [other] kids." 
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Additionally, the director felt that a charter needs to have a longer day, a longer 
year, and better student-to-teacher ratios. The director also alluded to creating a sort of 
school culture by retaining good teachers who know the students and stay at the school 
year after year. Another piece of advice was not to allow business people to run charters, 
but to use them as support. The director recommended "hooking up with or hiring a 
business person or a business firm." A director should not try to do the business piece 
alone, according to this interviewee. 
Since the closure of this charter school, the director has had the opportunity to 
visit other charter schools. The director's opinion of successful charter schools is that 
"they have way more money and they're selective in their population. One way or 
another, legal or not, they have to be." 
One of the director's final statements was the following: 
If I ever did it again, I would do it under somebody else's umbrella, and I would 
want serious political protection. Serious. As I said, if only we had not been under 
[the superintendent's] umbrella, I could have persuaded the board [to keep the 
charter]. 
Case Study Two: "It Was a Dream Come True With a Nightmare Behind My Head" 
I encouraged each interviewee to choose the location of his or her interview; 
often, the locations selected seemed to reflect the personality of the interviewees. For the 
second interview being reported here, I met the interviewee at a local restaurant and bar, 
with somewhat loud country music playing and peanut shells on the floor. The interview, 
therefore, was very relaxed and casual, and the interviewee seemed eager to share the 
charter school closure experience. 
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During the interview, this interviewee confirmed what she had reported on the 
online survey: she had no experience as an administrator prior to her involvement in the 
charter school, possessed a doctoral degree and an educational administrative degree, but 
did not hold a teaching or an administrative credential. 
The beginning. This particular charter story began in the 1999/2000 school year. 
This school wanted to be free of district regulations and fiscal constraints in order to 
implement a specific vision of education. Because of this emphasis on the personal vision 
of the director, this school could probably best be classified as a Type C charter school 
(using the typology discussed in Chapter Two, i.e., a charter school that was founded by a 
charismatic leader.) 
This charter was submitted for approval by the district in 2000. After receiving 
the initial state planning grant, the director and team of initial petitioners went to 
Washington, D.C. for a national charter school meeting. After that meeting, the 
petitioners were informed by their sponsoring agent (the local school district) that one of 
the requirements necessary for successful approval of their petition was to acquire 350 
signatures from parents of potential students. They turned in 600 signatures. The district, 
as the potential sponsoring agent for this charter school, rejected this first group of 
signatures. The district felt that too many of the signatures came from people outside of 
the boundaries of the neighborhood in which the school was to operate. The petitioners 
and director then submitted a new batch of signatures which was accepted by the district. 
The second part of the authorization process, according to this interviewee, was to 
obtain budget approval. Several proposed budgets were rejected, and the interviewee 
finally asked the district to create a budget for the charter that district officials would find 
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acceptable. The district complied. This whole approval process took two years, and 
during this time, the petitioners were becoming impatient and felt ignored. The 
interviewee also saw the delay as part of a larger pattern: 
One board member tried to limit the petition to three years. All of the people 
coming forward, all of the land that we had acquired, people were told that we 
were not going to receive our petition, and they garnered property that we were 
supposed to have. It was quite interesting. 
Additionally, the director stated, "We found out from the lenders that we were 
seeking that [the district] was telling them not to invest with us [the charter school] 
because [the district] was going to take the petition [off the table]." In other words, the 
district was giving the school's potential lenders the impression that the charter school 
would never be a secure investment because it would never actually open and, 
consequently never, generate any income to repay the loans. In essence, the director felt 
they were being set up for failure before the charter petition was ever even approved. 
Eventually, the charter petition was approved in 2002. The charter school did not 
actually have a physical space for operation until 2004, which the interviewee attributed 
to obstruction by the district as discussed above. According to the California Department 
of Education charter school database, the school was given a charter number by the State 
Board of Education in September of 2003, with an official school start date of August 
2005. This former director also indicated that the behaviors described above were not 
accidental. Indeed, she felt there was intentional collusion and undermining, particularly 
at the district level. For example, when the director was in the hospital, her secretary 
called her to let her know a key was available for "the new building". The director and 
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charter school board members involved in attempting to open the charter school never 
signed a contract for a new building; therefore, the director assumed someone at the 
district level forged one of the charter school board member's signatures in order to 
create a situation where, to the naked eye, the charter school had secured a physical space 
but no one was moving forward with the process of actually opening the school. 
The driving force for opening the charter from the district's perspective, 
according to this director, was the money that would come from an operational fee that 
the district would charge the charter school each year. Once the charter school board 
members and director were given the key to a building that supposedly this charter 
school's board members did not approve, the charter school was forced to open its doors 
unprepared and had to begin with only ten students. Within a few weeks there were 40 
students, mostly recruited through word of mouth in the community. 
This former charter school director felt the school continued to experience district 
interference even after the charter was approved. This time the director felt her family 
members, some of whom were involved in the charter school, were being harassed by the 
district: 
[The district] went after my younger brother who was a three-time soldier of the 
year over one of the largest military bases in the U.S. They started running for 
[harassing] him. They started running for [harassing] my sister, a pastor and a 
long reputation in [the district]. She was very instrumental in getting tennis courts, 
a playground, all of these things. She didn't even have any children. She had long 
established relationships with [the district] and could not understand why there 
was such hostility. Finally [we] realized it's not about hostility, it's about money. 
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When you're taking that kind of money out of a district, there's bound to be some 
whiplash behind it. 
Another example of district interference, according to the director, would be 
abrupt turnover of staff. "We'd hire a teacher and a week later she'd be offered a position 
in...[a school within the same district]. Okay? That's very interesting." The director felt 
that an offer like this was arranged by the district because of the hostile relationship that 
had developed between the charter school and the district. 
The closure. The director felt that the district was only concerned with 
maintaining the income flow that was associated with the administrative fees the district 
charged to charter schools. These funds helped support the salaries of high-level district 
employees. These administrative fees and the resulting "loss of revenue" for the charter 
school, from the director's perspective, was one of the factors that contributed to the 
charter school's lack of success. 
Eventually, however, the district took action to close its supposed "cash cow." 
According to the director, the district called a "special" meeting in order to revoke the 
charter and did not want the public there. The director characterized the meeting as 
follows: 
It was a tedious meeting. I never heard so much undermining before. I really saw 
then that charter schools are confronted with a whole host of problems. And the 
problems... you can't get a district to understand the loss of revenue, and revenue 
is so important because they [school districts] are so top-heavy [i.e., had a large, 
well-paid central office staff] you know? And they don't want to let go of that top. 
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According to the interviewee, the district supposedly did not want the meeting audio or 
video taped; however, the minutes were available on the Board of Education website and 
were reviewed as part of this study. The documents suggest that, officially, the reason 
that the district revoked the charter was due to "incomplete curriculum, an unbalanced 
budget, and an absence of a secured facility" (District Board of Education Special Board 
Meeting, December 2005). The motion to revoke the charter was passed unanimously. 
The interviewee's explanations for the closure are similar to her response 
regarding the school's closure in her open-ended survey response: "Forged documents, 
district and city council interference. [The intent of the district was that] we were never 
supposed to open, just be granted the charter." (Although the city council was referenced 
in the director's survey response, the city council was not mentioned in the interview. I 
was unable to acquire information from the interviewee to elaborate on that aspect of her 
survey response.) 
Later, the director and other petitioners appeared before the state board for an 
appeal but were denied. The director felt that, if the state would have stepped in and 
enforced "charter school laws" (the interviewee did not specify which ones) properly, 
there would have been a chance that the charter school could have stayed open. Also, the 
director believed that the school should not have been held to the Memorandum of 
Understanding (a type of business agreement arranged by the sponsoring agency and the 
charter school, which outlines fees to be paid from the charter school to the district as 
well as expectations for both parties in terms of liability, insurance, etc.) that was 
developed with the district as a part of the district's agreement to sponsor the charter 
school, but should have been held accountable to the actual charter petition, and nothing 
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more. All charter schools have Memorandums of Understanding with their sponsoring 
agencies and are required to fulfill the responsibilities outlined in the agreement: 
responsibilities that typically include such things as remaining fiscally solvent and being 
responsible for student achievement. 
The advice. According to this interviewee, the first piece of advice to those who 
want to begin or maintain a charter is to be vigilant. In other words, "If you are very 
passionate about [the charter] and you know that it's right, don't let these districts get 
away with anything." 
A second piece of advice was: have good legal council and make sure all 
documents are signed. Request a response from the district each time a document is 
submitted and require signatures on all documents and correspondence. The interviewee 
did not specify "good legal council" as a specific problem within the context of the rest of 
the interview until she was asked to offer her advice, but she had alluded to issues such as 
lack of trust and collusion that may have led to her offering this second piece of advice. 
Third, the relationship with the person in the oversight position for charter schools 
at the district level (sometimes referred to as the charter school liaison) is a key 
participant in insuring a charter school's success, no matter what the school's relationship 
is with the district in general. Interestingly, this interviewee did not mention the district's 
charter school liaison in her retrospective comments. 
If I were someone in the process of writing a charter petition and seeking 
approval, what would this director say to me? This director gave the following 
advice: I'd say, Sweetie, how much money do you have? How much time do you 
have? Are you really prepared for a fight? Are you in it for the money, or the 
61 
students? Which one? Are you self-sufficient or are you dependent? If you're self-
sufficient, you got a chance. If you're dependent, you ain't got a chance in heck, 
'cause they're gonna try and wipe you out blind. Legal councils, accountants, 
they'll tie you up. So, I'd say watch out for legal and accounting. Curriculum you 
can buy anywhere. You can buy it all day long. Buy it first. Your first dollars, buy 
your curriculum. 
Case Study Three: "Everything About It Screamed Run From This As Fast As You 
Can" 
This is the one and only interview that was conducted over the phone. I was able 
to secure a private office and digitally record the interview over speaker phone. This 
interviewee spent a few minutes asking me some questions regarding my study, including 
how many interviews I had done, how I chose the interviewees, and whether or not I had 
a difficult time tracking people down. This interviewee also asked a bit about my doctoral 
program and wanted to be reassured that the interview would remain confidential so that 
she would not be anxious about sharing the information about her charter school's 
closure. After this preliminary conversation, the interviewee indicated that she was 
comfortable with the protocol and procedures, and we proceeded with the interview. 
During our telephone conversation, the interviewee corroborated some basic 
information that she had reported on the online survey. For example, based on her 
description of the charter school during the interview, which was nearly identical to her 
description of the charter in the survey she had filled out prior to the interview, the 
charter almost certainly was a Category F charter school, i.e., an entrepreneur-initiated 
charter school. In addition, this interviewee indicated, once again, that she was an 
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administrator for less than one year prior to directing the charter school. The interviewee 
completed some graduate school, and had both a teaching credential and an educational 
administrative credential. She also stated that she was the director of two charter schools 
at the same time, one Kindergarten through eighth grade (the focus of the interview) and 
one ninth through twelfth grade. 
This is one of two schools in this study that was initially mis-categorized as 
"traditional" on the CDE charter school data base, when in fact it was a hybrid of 
independent study and site-based learning. Since this was another charter school 
contained in this study that was associated with a for-profit business, I chose to include 
this case study within the dissertation. 
The beginning. This K-8 charter school was numbered by the State Board of 
Education in December of 1999, with an official start date of January 2000; although the 
interviewee claimed that a marketing campaign for student recruitment began as early as 
1997. This school was affiliated with one of the first major for-profit corporations to 
identify the niche of the home schooling market. According to the former director: 
[The for-profit corporation] identified that they could make a lot of money on the 
home schooling market and, generally, they were not educators. They started a 
school. At that time, you could start a school as a non-profit [501(c)(3)]. You 
didn't have to be chartered through a district. 
Documentation from The Center for Education Reform, however, cites an elementary 
school district as the authorizer of the charter school. It seems that the for-profit 
corporation was a business partner that had its charter petition authorized with the school 
district. 
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This director joined the organization in 1999, after issues with the organization's 
management of charters arose within the state legislature and elsewhere. There had been 
various lawsuits over the corporation's oversight that resulted in legislation and changes 
in the law. According to the director, some of the current charter school laws in the state 
are a direct result of the problems generated by the corporation associated with this 
charter school closure. 
This corporation created what the interviewee called "sweetheart deals" with 
schools and districts all over California. The interviewee asserted that the corporation 
collected approximately 22% of this school's Average Daily Attendance (ADA) monies 
as overhead fees. She also maintained that the district had a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the corporation to collect seven percent of the school's revenues. In 
other words, the school allocated 29% of its budget for the corporation and district 
combined. 
The former director also mentioned that the corporation attempted to create the 
appearance of a local, grassroots type of charter school and marketed each school as such. 
The corporation looked for people to run each school site locally. Formerly, each school 
had been run from a central location. Each site had a local lead teacher, but that person 
did not have any accountability, they were more or less an "administrative functionary." 
This interviewee was hired as the "school director" without a lot of power. This 
interviewee summarizes her role as follows: 
I think the intent was for me to run, what do you call it, interference between [the 
corporation] and the teacher groups and the districts and all that. I was expected to 
play nice and go along with the goals of [the corporation] and there were big 
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bonuses, you know? They signed me on at 55,000 dollars [annually] and they 
waived 20,000 in my face for doing a good job, which I should have been making 
anyway just as the whole salary (laughter)." 
The corporate oversight for this charter consisted of a monthly collection of 
teacher-signed attendance verification papers and students' work samples. According to 
the interviewee, the corporation did not oversee the day-to-day work of the charter or 
provide an accounting of expenditures for materials that were purchased with the budgets 
they were given. "There were rumors of trips to Hawaii that I heard about," she joked. 
The closure. According to the director, the reason the school closed was because 
the corporation held the purse strings and handled finances in an unethical manner. The 
agreement was that the county would receive the ADA money for this particular charter 
school (in what is often called a dependent charter relationship) and the county in turn 
would write a check to the corporation. After receiving the money from the county, the 
corporation withheld a reserve of one thousand dollars per student; however, the director 
and the staff were supposedly unaware of this action and were led to believe that the 
school was going bankrupt: that there was no way the school would be able to "make it" 
financially. 
Once the director became aware that the corporation was withholding reserve 
money from the school site, she began to think that the school could probably make it 
through the year without going bankrupt. However, the director shared her reservations in 
staying at the school: 
I could have chosen to try to work it out but I still had an agreement with the 
district. The district still wanted seven percent of our ADA. I think I could have 
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managed [the corporation] but it felt very yucky. It felt improper. It was ethically 
wrong. Everything about it screamed run from this as fast as you can, so I 
participated in the willing closure of that school. 
The director categorized the reason for the closure as an ethics violation: 
If [the corporation] had really been dedicated to students and supporting student 
learning and working toward that, we probably could have made it work. If the 
district would not have been all about how much money they could get out of 
charter schools, we could have negotiated. We could have collaborated. 
This former director gave a similar response regarding the charter school's closure in her 
open-ended survey response: 
The school closed due to 1) conflicts of interest by sponsoring district and 
management company (business corporation); 2) ethical violations around 
"phony" MOU's that gave away 7% of school revenue to sponsor district; 3) 
fiscal mismanagement by contracted management company which took up to 22% 
of school revenue. 
In October 2001, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 740 (SB 740) to 
strengthen the oversight of non-classroom based schools and implement cutbacks in state 
funding for schools failing to meet specified spending standards (RAND Corporation, 
2005). At a district board meeting held to establish funding for the charter school for the 
following school year, it was determined that the school would receive 70% of the 
funding they received the previous school year as a direct result of SB 740. According to 
RAND Corporation's analysis of the bill, "concerns have arisen that the process may 
have resulted in fiscal instability, an inefficient allocation of resources, and a reduction in 
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innovation." The charter school closed in 2002, with "financial: inadequate funding" 
cited as the official reason for closure as documented by The Center for Education 
Reform (2009). 
Advice. This director believes that the day-to-day administrator must have a 
handle on the budget: "When idealism is in the forefront, you don't have a lot of practical 
day-to-day knowledge. That will not be helpful. At the same time, that 100% business 
approach is not student-centered, and that won't work either." 
The development of a dynamic school community plus the dedication of the 
teachers were two items that the interviewee believed were positive attributes of this 
particular charter school. According to the interviewee, teachers should really be invested 
in students' success. Teachers should also be involved in the operation of the school 
knowing what kind of impact their contribution will have. This impact, according to the 
interviewee, should manifest itself as follows: 
They [the teachers] don't just come to work. They come to work understanding 
what it takes for the school to survive and what their role in that is. Whether it is 
to ensure that students make it to STAR testing (California's standardized test that 
measures students' mastery of the state content standards), or whether it's 
efficient budget expenditures on their part when they're looking for new materials 
for their students. I think traditional systems leave teachers out too much. They 
not only leave them out, but they do not give them credit for the teachers' desire 
to know what is happening, and to understand what is happening. 
Finally, this director thought that, in general, ethics violations need to be 
eliminated at all costs. Any charter school and its sponsoring agency need to work 
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together, and not against, one another. Funding needs to be appropriate and delivered 
accordingly. 
Case Study Four: "When a Person Is Anti-Charter, They're Going To Do Anything 
They Can To Close the Charter Schools Down" 
This is one of two interviews that occurred at a school site where the interviewee 
was currently working. This particular interviewee is now the director of a different 
charter school in a low-socioeconomic urban area. This interviewee reported having more 
than nine years experience as a school administrator prior to her experience as a charter 
school director. She held a doctoral degree and teaching credential, but did not currently 
hold an educational administrative credential. 
The beginning. The interviewee's first charter, which was the topic of our 
conversation in her new charter school setting, was a middle school/high school model 
that began in a leased church building in September of 2003. Based on the director's 
description of the inception of this charter school, this school would most likely be 
described as a Type A charter school (i.e., urban/ethnocentric/grassroots), as it seems she 
wanted the school to serve a very specific community's needs. 
The school began with approximately 91 students in its first year. The stipulation 
attached to the charter approval was that there would be a second school site by the end 
of the second year of operation. By the start of the 2004/2005 school year, the student 
population grew to over 400. 
The interviewee, who was a university professor at the time the charter school 
began, started the charter school for the following reasons: 
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I just wanted to get closer to the community. I had been in the university for a 
long time and I knew that our community has some very, very, very special needs, 
and I just felt that I was distanced from them, and I needed to work with my 
people is really what it amounted to. I was an elementary school teacher and then 
I had my own private school for seven years. Then I went back to the university, 
but there was always a longing to have my school again, and this time, because of 
the expense and all the money you have to pour into it, it was like the best of both 
worlds to have like a private school with the state funding. 
This former director believes the major success of this charter school—a school 
that closed after only 13 months of operation—was the parent/teacher commitment. The 
teachers were dedicated to the vision, which was to provide a high quality, private-school 
type of education to low socioeconomic youth. The parents were committed to the 
philosophy of the principal and staff, which was, "If education works, it works for all." 
Parents and community members would volunteer in the charter school's after-school 
specialty programs such as sewing, cooking, and drama, and would work on the parent 
council in order to support school fundraising efforts. 
The closure. The problem, according to the interviewee, was that the state 
funding for the school was based on the ADA from the previous year. With an ADA 
based on 91 students, and a school that had over 400 students, the funding to operate on a 
day-to-day basis was far from adequate. The interviewee approached the county office 
(the charter's sponsoring agent) with the dilemma and received the following response, 
"It's not our problem. We're not a lending institution and we're not a loan institution 
either. So, if you cannot sustain yourself, we're going to close you down." 
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The interviewee thought the relationship the school had with the county was good 
until a new superintendent came on board. Word came down that he was very "anti-
charter." The director had been told that everything better be kept up at the school site, 
because, supposedly, the new superintendent was out to shut charter schools down. 
According to County Board of Education Minutes from October 2004, the superintendent 
recommended that the Board take action to revoke the charter due to "fiscal insolvency, 
fiscal mismanagement, and other material violations of the law and/or charter." The 
motion was moved, seconded, and carried, with five board members voting yes and one 
board member abstaining. Even though other charters in the county were being forced to 
"jump through hoops" (the interviewee's characterization) and were struggling with 
renewals, this director felt that the one major reason this charter closed was lack of 
financial resources, not fiscal mismanagement as the superintendent had stated during the 
board meeting. The Center for Education Reform (2009) cites mismanagement as the 
official reason for closure with an explanation of "fiscal insolvency, fiscal 
mismanagement, and other material violations of the law and/or charter", which reflects 
the reasons given by the superintendent and board members at the board meeting. A 
somewhat different but still complimentary explanation of reasons for the school's 
closing can be found in the interviewee's open-ended survey response to a question that 
asked her to elaborate on the closure of her charter school: 
[This charter school] was closed because we 'grew too rapidly' (ADA of 91 in 
2003/2004 to 438 in September 2004 and growing). We were deemed fiscally 
insolvent because we did not have the finances to sustain the rapid student growth 
of paying for 38 staff, two buildings, etc. The funds that we received [were] for 
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the 91 ADA for the previous school year rather than for the current number of 
students that we had enrolled for the 2004 fall term. These funds could not sustain 
us until the current ADA funds kicked in around January of 2005. Therefore, [our 
sponsoring agency] revoked our charter and refused to financially support our 
school. 
The interviewee appealed to the board of directors of the county office of 
education to keep the school open. The director reported saying the following to the 
county: 
I know and you know that you can do this if you wanted to but, whatever the 
reason, you do not want to support the school. When we were first approved by 
you, it was the best charter [proposal] you had ever read. That's what you said. 
And now you're gonna close me down? 
The interviewee eventually came to the conclusion that "when a [superintendent] is anti-
charter they're going to do anything they can to close the charter schools down"; 
however, in her own admission, the director stated that she knew that "we [the charter 
school] did not have the funds [to be fiscally solvent]." 
Advice. This director's first piece of advice is: in order to start a charter school, 
one needs a large amount of money. The director also stated that the key to a charter 
school's success is the teachers, but she quickly added a caveat: "I think one of the 
downfalls, the disadvantages of charters is that they pay teachers less. We require more 
so we should pay them more." (Note: This statement may not apply to district-sponsored 
charters that often are required to use the district's pay scale for teachers.) The director 
continued to emphasize the importance of teachers by stating the following: "To me, the 
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greatest investment is to have your teachers on board and creative, excited about 
educating students and if you have that combination, the school can only go up." The 
interviewee added that, in hiring teachers, one needs to ask the right interview questions 
to insure that the teachers are really committed. 
Case Study Five: "I Really Feel Like Doors Are Opened and Closed For Me Along 
the Way, and I Never Had Anything Slammed Shut So Hard" 
My fifth interviewee, according to her survey response, had more than nine years 
of experience as a school administrator prior to her time as director of a charter school. 
She also held a master's degree, a teaching credential, and an educational administrative 
credential. My interview with her occurred in a small coffee shop in a beach community 
on a Sunday afternoon. The interviewee seemed a bit nervous, but once we were able to 
establish some mutual connection with a local university, the interviewee became more 
relaxed. As in a number of other interviews, the interviewee became passionate and more 
willing to share information once we began to move deeper into the story of the charter 
school she had once directed and which was now closed. 
The beginning. This charter school, which qualitative data suggest could be a 
Type C charter school, or a charter founded by a charismatic educational leader, began in 
a very rural agricultural area on a ranch. The school initially was a hybrid home school; 
meaning, students were home schooled four days a week, but met at a site with a teacher 
one day a week. The owner of the ranch offered the ranch for student use once a week. 
The idea for using the ranch as a fully functioning school site stemmed from the 4H and 
science activities students were able to engage in while on the ranch site. However, this 
particular ranch ended up not being available for full-time school facilities. Fortunately, 
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there was a ranch across the street that was used as a home for boys. This ranch had an 
unused 30-acre farm. Then the home for boys "had a change in management" and the 
new manager, according to the interviewee "turned [out] to be a very visionary-type 
person, and we started working together on a plan that would put a charter school on the 
farm." 
In 2003, the school received $305,000 in charter school start-up grant money from 
the state; simultaneously, the boys' ranch began experiencing personnel problems. The 
state came in and closed the home for boys down, along with the rest of the ranch. Now, 
the interviewee had $305,000, no school site, and a sponsoring district's school board that 
was questioning her judgment. The interviewee hired a lawyer to draw up the final 
charter petition paperwork, which was approved by the local school district. 
The interviewee decided to invest some of this start-up money in a grant writer in 
order to secure funds for the charter school she and the manager of the boys' ranch had 
begun to envision. The interviewee had attempted grant writing before for specific 
programs for the hybrid home school, with no success, so she felt it was necessary to 
enlist the help of a professional in order to increase the chances of receiving additional 
charter school funding. 
Because the interviewee still utilized the ranch as a site for students who were 
home-schooled to meet with a certified teacher and gain experience working on a ranch, 
the board of the charter school suggested that the school should share another district site 
that housed other home school students only a few days a week. This is what the 
interviewee decided to do. 
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According to the interviewee, the district superintendent was supportive of the 
new charter school but did not want any student recruitment to take place due to 
dwindling numbers in the district. The interviewee recalled the district's position and the 
charter school's response as follows: 
We were all in this big, huge financial crisis. It would have been a real problem 
for me to advertise in that community, so what I did with the grant money is I 
advertised on the radio, in the newspapers, knowing full well that most of the 
local people don't read the local papers or listen to that radio station [therefore, 
the charter school would not be in competition with the sponsor school district for 
pupils]. So we tried to get people from all over the county. So we ended up 
getting thirty students and we opened on our campus that fall. 
The school then opened on a shared school site with access to one classroom and 
service of one teacher hired by the charter school director. The following school year, the 
school tried to have kindergarten through eighth grade with two classrooms and two 
teachers, with students separated by gender. The director had done some research in 
gender-segregated education and felt strongly that this model would benefit the charter 
school's student population. By the end of the first semester of the second year of 
operation, however, things began to go downhill. 
Moving toward closure. Although, according to the interviewee, there was "a lot 
of good stuff happening in the fall," previous advice that she had been given was 
suddenly beginning to make sense to her. When opening the school, the interviewee had 
been told not to start with less than 200 students. The interviewee stated that she believed 
this advice might have been linked to parental involvement. "The gossip lines get fired up 
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really quick, and if you have any body like that in your school [i. e. a gossip], there's 
going to be trouble." Parents began to doubt the aptitude of the teachers and the ability of 
the director, and some parents began to communicate their feelings more forcefully to 
other parents within the school. The combination of former home school students as well 
as students placed in the charter school because they were having academic and 
behavioral problems at previous schools seemed to have contributed to internal chaos 
which led to the school's closure. One of the school's two teachers quit because there 
were students at "a lot of different levels." The interviewee added: "We had really low 
kids and really high kids, and the two teachers were really going crazy trying to do it all." 
Finally, two students left the school, and the director couldn't justify having two 
classrooms and two full-time teachers with such low numbers (under twenty students in 
each class). So, at the end of the first semester of the second year of operation, the 
director "dissolved the school and incorporated it into the [school on the shared site] 
which meets on Tuesdays and Thursdays for math and science." The interviewee told the 
sponsoring district (which was also the charter school's board of directors) that the school 
was voluntarily closing due to low enrollment. 
One of the problems the interviewee recognized from the start was inconsistent 
support from the district board, which was the sponsor of the charter. The charter was 
held up for five months while the board decided whether or not it wanted to accept the 
$305,000 in state grant money that the interviewee obtained to start the school. In other 
words (i.e. the words of the former director), "everybody sort of ignored the elephant in 
the room." According to a charter school closure spreadsheet provided by the Charter 
School Division of the California Department of Education, this charter school was 
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officially closed in January of 2006 due to low enrollment, which the interviewee cited as 
one of a number of actual issues that threatened the continuation of the school. 
Another element that could not have been predicted, but that contributed to the 
closure of the charter school, was the closure of the original ranch site where the school 
would have initially been located. The interviewee shared the emotions felt when the 
ranch was closed: 
I really feel like doors are opened and closed for me along the way, and I never 
had anything slammed shut so hard. The teen ranch had been there for 100 years 
and when I decide and this other guy decides to do this, bam! It's shut, and I said, 
okay, somebody's trying to tell me something. 
The interviewee gave a somewhat more detailed list of reasons for the school's 
closing in her response to the open-ended survey item that allowed the sharing of this 
information. This was the response: 
I worked on the charter plan with a boys' home/foster care facility. We were 
going to place the charter on the ranch. The ranch had legal problems and closed 
after 100 years (that had nothing to do with the charter). That meant I had to open 
on the school site. This meant our students would come from the district. The 
district was already losing students. We advertised outside of the district to get 
students. 
It seemed as if the director had envisioned the school as a part of this ranch, and 
that it was difficult for her to separate the physical site of the school with the vision she 
had for the charter itself, which was environmental, outdoor education. Since the 
interviewee appeared so disheartened by the closure of the boys' ranch, I believe she felt 
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the school would have been more successful, and would have remained open, if 
everything had worked out with the boys' ranch site. 
Advice. The first bit of advice this interviewee offered is to begin with as many 
students as possible. She, in fact, argued that low enrollment is "why so many charter 
schools want to be in urban areas. You have a lot of kids to draw from. In rural, there is 
nobody near us. We're out in the boon docks and the people who come are driving from 
[10 or 20 miles away]." The interviewee also added, "If I were doing it over again, it 
would take a lot longer and I would have more possible students." 
Second, the interviewee said marketing is a factor that needs to be seriously 
considered when starting a charter school. She also stated, "You can't screen out 
[undesirable] applicants, but you can make it doubly-hard to get in." The interviewee 
suggested the completion of a rigorous application process, as well as student and parent 
interviews, as requirements for being admitted to the school. "You have to have an 
application process that gets the students that need to be there or belong there, the real 
determined ones, rather than T don't have anyplace else to go so I'll come to your 
school' kind of attitude.'" 
Furthermore, parents need to understand how you will serve students with special 
needs, including the strengths and limits of what you can provide to students. The 
interviewee added one additional piece of advice: 
Just from experience, I would never start with a junior high. We're rethinking 
how we're doing this right now, and I would make this particular school a K-3 or 
a K-6 at the beginning, and I'd have two classrooms at each grade level, one boy 
and one girl. 
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Case Study Six: "We Basically Gave Up the Charter As Easily As We Got Into It" 
This interviewee reported having less than three years experience as a school 
administrator prior to directing a charter school. He also had a master's degree, a teaching 
credential, and an educational administrative credential. Due to the parental involvement 
described by the interviewee, this school would best be described as a Type E, or parent-
led charter school, based on the typology found in Chapter Two of this study. 
This was the second of two interviews that occurred on a school site where the 
former charter school administrator currently worked. This interview was conducted in 
the administrator's office on a middle school site in a very rural area. The interviewee 
was eager and willing to share information, and consciously attempted to eliminate any 
potential distractions prior to the start of the interview. 
"School of choice" to charter school. The particular district for this school 
offered students and parents "schools of choice," which are basically schools that parents 
can choose to send their children instead of their closest neighborhood school. These 
schools, according to the interviewee, were granted more discretion by the district in 
terms of decision-making so they could make choices based on families' needs and input. 
The interviewee described the process of the school first becoming a school of choice as 
follows: 
Our district approached some of the parents that were key in our district that were 
raising a lot of issues, doing a lot of different things and said, "How would you 
like to start your own school in our district?", and the parents just thought, "Wow! 
What a great idea! What a great opportunity." So a steering committee of seven 
parents was chosen to draft something. I don't think our school district thought 
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that these seven parents would ever get anything off the ground, but they put 
together all.. .they wanted to do as a school, brought it back to our school district, 
found that there was enough community interest to fly it, and so then they went 
about seeking an administrator to kind of be the first employee and help them get 
that going. I ended up getting kind of talked into applying for that position. So I 
got the job and worked with these parents prior to starting the school. After the 
first couple of years we were just a school of choice in the school district. 
It was after the second year that the district approached this school of choice, 
primarily its parents and administrator, and asked them if they would like to apply for 
charter school status. Those who associated with the school had questions about the 
advantages and disadvantages of becoming a charter school. The district representatives 
explained that becoming charter would be beneficial to the district if and when parents 
from other schools within the district came to them asking why this "school of choice" 
had programs or materials that were different than other schools in the district. Having 
the charter school title, in the school district's opinion, would exempt the district from 
having to justify differences between that particular school and the rest. 
Interestingly, the administrator and parents made it clear to the district that they 
wanted to be a dependent charter school. A dependent charter is closely tied financially to 
the district and the employees would still be employed by the district. The school district 
would also be their charter sponsor. The interviewee described in more detail why the 
school wanted to remain closely associated with the district: 
All of us were happy being a part of the [school district] as employees, as 
everybody. We were funneling our kids into the one high school in the district and 
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so we didn't want to lose that connection. We also didn't want to have to fund all 
of our own other positions, to run a business office, to do benefits, to do all that. 
So we functioned as a dependent charter. So all of our business stuff was taken 
care of. The district still paid for our facilities and did the whole bit. It really just 
allowed us to operate as a school of choice without people being able to hassle us. 
This school is the only conversion charter school of this interview group. A 
conversion charter school is an existing public school that literally converts (staff, 
building, students, etc.) to charter school status. The interviewee and a steering 
committee of parents wrote the charter petition. Once the petition was written, seventy-
five percent of the current staff chose by vote to convert the school to charter school 
status. When the petition was approved by the district for the 1997/1998 school year, the 
interviewee felt that "there was really nothing we were doing any better, any different. 
We didn't receive in a sense any different funding. All of our funding went to the district 
and the district then funded us as a school." The interviewee did note, however, that one 
benefit that they had as a charter school was the ability to choose any curriculum they 
wanted. 
The closure. After the first two years of operating as a charter school, the 
administrator and parents who were part of the decision making process (referred to as 
the "steering committee") decided to give up the charter, as stated by the interviewee, "as 
easily as we got into it." The reason for the closure, according to the interviewee, was 
because 
we said we were done and not because of any problems, just because sheer 
operating and budgeting and all that. It became easier to do it as a non-charter 
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school, and what the school district said is that you guys can continue operating 
the way you're operating. We'll back you on whatever you say you're doing. 
The reason the interviewee gave for closure aligns with his response to the open-ended 
survey question: "It simply became easier to operate as a district school of choice, rather 
than a charter school." The official reason documented by the California Department of 
Education for the closure is listed as "reverted to non-charter status," which is dated 
August of 2000. 
Now that the school is once again considered a "school of choice", the 
interviewee described the school as operating today "in year thirteen about the same way 
as [it] did in the first two years without a charter and the years [it was] a charter." The 
interviewee shared the belief that the school would have still been a charter had it not 
been for some charters in the state taking advantage of the freedom associated with 
charters. District administration had told this director that having the school continue as a 
charter school would cost them (the district) more money, and the director stated that no 
one, including himself, parents, or teachers, fought to keep the school as a charter school. 
The director's main concern was curriculum, not how to fund or finance the school. The 
director fought to maintain the use of certain curriculum his site was able to utilize while 
operating as a charter school. Since the school was allowed to continue to use that 
curriculum due to what the director cited as high API scores (the school had an API score 
of 804 in 1999 according to the CDE data files), he didn't feel the need to hold on to 
charter school status. 
Advice. The interviewee's three areas of advice were: (a) possess a solid reason to 
start a charter, (b) have energy and enthusiasm, and (c) secure a positive sponsor and/or 
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district relationship. The first question the interviewee would want to ask someone 
starting a charter is why the charter petition is being written in the first place. Second, it 
would be important to "garner the enthusiasm, energy, and support of staff and parents 
necessary to pull [a charter school] off." Finally, the interviewee offered this advice, most 
likely due to the positive relationship he had with his sponsoring district: 
Do your homework on the district that you ask to sponsor your charter because 
you've got to have the support of that district because you could be a little bit at 
the whim of the district. I mean, they can't just cut you off for no reason at all, but 
they can make your life miserable in the meantime. 
Case Study Seven: "I Started Out With Great Hopes and Just Came Out 
Completely Disillusioned" 
This interviewee's only experience as an administrator was at this particular 
charter school. The interviewee did not possess an educational administrative credential. 
She did have a master's degree and a teaching credential. 
This interview took place in the interviewee's home in a very rural area of central 
California. I was welcomed into the interviewee's home on a weekend morning, and we 
sat at the kitchen table. Although the interview occurred in the interviewee's 
environment, I sensed that the interviewee was nervous about being interviewed. I did, 
however, perceive that the interviewee shared information freely as time progressed and 
became more comfortable as we discussed her version of the closure story. 
Although I initially stated that I would exclude independent study charter schools, 
this school was poorly labeled in the California Department of Education documents I 
originally analyzed. I did not discover that the school was considered an independent 
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study school until the qualitative interview was conducted. The school did, however, 
have classes that met once a week. The school site also had a computer lab, staff that 
conducted meetings with parents and students, and a special education staff person that 
worked with students on a regular basis. Based on those descriptors, this school seemed 
to reflect more of a hybrid program than a strict independent study program. Since the 
data had been collected and, as it turned out, the school was one of three of my case 
studies that were operated by a corporation, I have included this interviewee's story here. 
The beginning. This charter school began after the local school district agreed to 
sponsor a charter petition that was submitted by a business organization. The school 
district was the official sponsor, while the business started and managed the school. 
Based on this description and the typology listed in Chapter Two of this study, this school 
could be regarded as a Type F, or entrepreneur-initiated, charter school. 
The interviewee opened the charter school office facility in the spring of 2000 as 
the program director. The interviewee was at the school for a year and a half before it 
closed at the end of the 2000/2001 school year. From the start, it seems the interviewee 
and the school tried to break away from the business management who, in the words of 
the interviewee, "owned us because they started up the school, and we were trying to get 
away from them and be sponsored by the county office [of education]." The business had 
control over the budget and money, and the site-based personnel had control over 
personnel and curriculum. 
Initially, the interviewee felt that there was no accountability for student 
achievement: "When I took over, the school was not run based on California state 
standards or anything. People were doing what they wanted to do, and that was my goal 
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to make it more educationally sound." Teacher accountability was also an issue. The 
interviewee said that the school had to change some policies in order to ensure the 
following: 
You had to have a credential to be one of our teachers, and we aligned pay to that. 
Pay was assigned originally to how many students you had. You got paid per 
student, and so some teachers had 40, 50 students, and how do you manage that 
many students and manage them well? 
The interviewee was "not pleased with [the business entity] because they were 
taking a million dollars a year in [the school's] state funding for their operating 
expenses." The interviewee knew that similar schools were giving a certain percentage to 
their business partners in exchange for specific services, but not the large amount that this 
particular charter school was paying back to its business sponsor. The interviewee 
described the amount of money given to the business sponsor as "excessive"; she stated: 
"I was questioning a lot of things. They basically told me that I was going to be fired or 
[had to] resign because they didn't like what I was leading the school into: getting in with 
[another sponsor to negate the business partnership]." 
The closure. According to the interviewee, in order to maintain the charter, the 
school needed "to get into an educational-based, not a business-based" partnership. The 
interviewee attempted to get the county office of education to sponsor the school. As 
other alternative sponsors were being sought, the business partner was telling the 
interviewee and others at the school that they "were in financial difficulty." The 
interviewee stated, "We had to rely on audits and stuff [provided by the business]. It was 
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very, very difficult progress and I didn't trust them at all. I did not like them. I did not 
trust them the more I got to know them." 
Because of the controversy surrounding this particular business partner, which 
also partnered with approximately nine other charter schools across the state, the local 
school district did not want to be associated with this charter school. In the end, the 
business organization and the program director dissolved the school and did not seek 
renewal of its charter. 
The interviewee mentioned the push toward a new sponsor in her open-ended 
survey response as well: "We wanted to be governed by the county rather than the private 
group that managed the school. [The private group] were charging too much for too few 
services—question of ethical behavior—on their part." 
Additionally, a change in leadership at the district level also contributed, in the 
eyes of the interviewee, to the downfall of the school: 
There was a change in administration in the district half-way through which 
changed the whole complexion of the school. The first superintendent was 
looking at the charter school as bringing in money to the district and he retired. 
Then the second superintendent looked at charter schools as being problems and 
not seeing it as a benefit to the district. So the relationship went way downhill 
when the administration changed. 
The interviewee believed that the bottom line reason why the charter closed had 
to do with "misuse of funds". The interviewee described the end of the charter as follows: 
I think it was maybe a day late and a dollar short. We participated in the charter 
school conventions and all of that and it was a great thing, but we were coming in 
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at the end of the movement and that entrepreneurial thing of having a company 
running a school, I don't think was a good idea. I think that that was the downfall 
of the school as well. It had no close connections to a school district and that was 
a bit of an issue because it had no one saying that this is inappropriate; this isn't 
how you should do it. They [the business] were trying to get as much money as 
they could for themselves and do as little as possible that they could for the 
students. Now I, on the other hand, thought that most of the money should go to 
the students and not to running the business. 
The official reason for closure, which occurred in June of 2002, was "oversight 
challenges", as recorded by the California Department of Education. This was reiterated 
in a 2009 national charter school closure list compiled by The Center for Education 
Reform, which stated mismanagement as the reason for closure, with the following 
explanation: "leadership poorly managed school operations." It is unclear who was 
considered "leadership." 
Advice. The interviewee felt that more accountability would have allowed the 
charter school to be more successful. In this interviewee's opinion, there was no 
accountability from the business partner back to the school for how money was spent. 
The interviewee shared that there was a School Site Council (SSC), "yet we [the SSC] 
could make no decisions or anything because there was no knowledge of what our budget 
was really. We would ask for a detailed budget and we would never get a detailed 
budget." 
This interviewee also suggested that a charter school should always have a 
"strong tie to a district so that the district would really be a proponent of the school." The 
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interviewee then listed specific advice for someone wanting to open or maintain a charter 
school: 
Number one, you have to know where the money is. The money was the big key 
in the running of [our] school because you can't do things without the funding. I 
think number two, you have to have solid backing of the district because charter 
schools have to be sponsored by the district. You have to have a good relationship 
person right there with the superintendent because if the superintendent isn't pro, 
it's not going to work. You need to have a goal out there that this is what you 
want to achieve with this school. Ours was to meet the needs of the population 
that was not fitting into the regular public schools. [The goal] has to be clear[ly] 
defined and you have to have a vision of how you're going to meet that. I think 
you have to start off with the vision: this is who we want to serve and how are we 
going to serve them best. 
On a smaller, more day-to-day scale, the interviewee felt that a successful charter 
would need to have special education services and support personnel in place. This 
school did contract independent services for students who required special education 
support, but it was quite a financial burden on the school. Additionally, a charter school 
needs a staff that is knowledgeable in standardized test requirements, such as STAR 
testing and high school graduation requirements. As mentioned previously, this program 
director sensed a disconnect between the district sponsor and the school itself. Often 
times mandates and protocol for testing come directly from the district to school sites; 
therefore, standardized testing was something this school had to tackle on its own. The 
interviewee also believed that a charter school has to have someone who is "very detail-
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oriented": one who can look after records and engage in record-keeping. This would 
eliminate the dependence a school such as this one would have on a business partner or 
other organization to maintain records and paperwork. The interviewee commented that 
"a lot of us in education are global thinkers and we're not into the details of running a 
business, and it is a business too so you need to be thinking along that line." Also, a 
charter school needs qualified teachers, and the school needs to be able to pay the 
teachers the same as any other school in the district so that they want to work for a 
charter school without being punished financially. This school seemed able to provide 
equal pay after the pay-per-student salary policy was eliminated. 
Finally, the interview ended with the interviewee's reflections on the personal 
experiences associated with the former charter school: 
I think the vision was great when we started. We had such high hopes and it was 
so exciting getting it going and stuff and the freedom to be able to do different 
things in a different way. It was great. I still think there's possibility out there but 
when I hear 'charter' now I cringe, just because I don't know who's got the 
control. If it's not the education people, if it's business people, I don't trust them, 
and it's just the way I was burnt. I started out with great hopes and just came out 
completely disillusioned. 
Case Study Eight: "The Dynamics Were More One of Survival and Not One of the 
Perfect Place, For Me, Academically" 
In this case, a grassroots organization eager to open a school that focused on 
education aligned with conservation and animal protection was granted approval for a 
charter school by a school district. This school was given a charter number by the State 
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Board of Education in January of 2004, as documented by the California Department of 
Education. Because of the very specific vision of the school's charter, this school could 
be classified as a Type A charter school (urban/ethnocentric/grassroots). 
The interviewee, who at the time was the director of another existing charter 
school, offered to oversee this charter since the founding organization did not want 
anything to do with the managerial aspect of the school. The director also had experience 
both as a classroom teacher and as a manager in a large package delivery business. He 
also held an administrative credential, a teaching credential, and an M.B.A. Prior to 
working with this charter school, he had six years of experience as a school administrator. 
The beginning. The charter school did not physically open as soon as it was 
approved due to the lack of a director. Another struggle during the initial charter approval 
timeline was lack of space. Once there was a director in place, the district asked the 
director to commit to lease four classrooms for one hundred thousand dollars. The 
director agreed. At the time both parties made this commitment, however, the school only 
had one enrolled student: the teacher-principal's child. According to the interviewee, 
another local charter school was having some problems at the time, and decided to move 
their students over to his charter school. Because of this migration of students, they began 
the school year with 10 students and eventually ended up with 23. The charter school was 
open for one year during the 2005/2006 school year. 
As we proceeded into the interview, the interviewee revealed that he was the 
executive director overseeing a teacher-principal. He also noted that the initial founding 
organization "fell off the map. We never had contact with them from day one. We took 
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the charter document and we did the best we could implementing their vision. But they 
were not involved." 
The interviewee also felt that the sponsoring school district was not reasonable in 
helping the school secure adequate or cost-effective space. The interviewee felt rushed to 
open the school once the director was in place and the district had leased out its 
classrooms. He stated, "I think if I had six months, I could have done a very strong 
marketing effort in a very poor area and would have been able to solidify [enrollees]." 
Not seeking renewal. According to the interviewee, the charter was up for 
renewal in the 2006/2007 school year; however, the director and others associated with 
the school [i.e. the charter school board]: 
decided not to try to pursue getting it re-approved. It was too big of a bear. We 
weren't servicing enough kids. It wasn't growing through word of mouth like we 
would have thought. Facilities were an issue. It was just too difficult to keep 
going. 
Additionally, the interviewee felt that "the theme of the charter was limited in attracting 
students [and their families] because it had a very liberal flair to it." By no uncertain 
terms was the charter closed or revoked by the district sponsor. As stated by the 
interviewee, "The laws that pertain to charter schools: fiscal responsibility, legality, 
children learning... none of those pieces came into play [in the school's closure]." This 
statement is supported by the documentation provided by the California Department of 
Education, which states "lack of facilities" as the formal reason for the school's closure. 
The Center for Education Reform, however, lists financial as the reason for closure, along 
with inadequate enrollment. Both can be true, however, since it was financially 
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impossible to maintain school operations with such a small student population and such a 
relatively high lease price for classrooms from the district. No other feasible space 
options were located or secured by the director. 
The charter also closed, according to the interviewee, due to lack of enrollment. 
The interviewee stated that "we told the teacher-principal, if you can't increase the 
numbers, we have to release these students. We have to make a decision of what [we are] 
going to do with these kids. There were still twenty-three bodies to take care of." 
Although during the interview, multiple reasons were given for the school's 
closure, the interviewee made the following statement as his open-ended survey response: 
"Lack of space forced the school to mitigate marketing efforts for new students." The 
director seemed to feel stuck between a rock and a hard place: the school couldn't 
continue to lease such expensive classrooms from the district, but on the other hand, he 
couldn't find comparable space; therefore, he couldn't increase the school's income 
through student recruitment since he did not know whether or not adequate space would 
be secured before the start of the next school year. 
Throughout the interview, it was clear that the interviewee took responsibility for 
the lack of a more assertive marketing campaign for the school, as well as the need to hire 
people that had more experience with kindergarten through sixth grade education. 
Furthermore, the interviewee felt that more stakeholders from the community should 
have been involved in order to secure the school's status in the neighborhood and create 
more of an interest in the school. 
Advice. The interviewee elaborated on several key areas that he felt would allow 
a charter school to exist and thrive. The key areas are: positive attitude, commitment, 
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fiscal planning, alignment with an organization to secure physical space, and solid 
guiding principles. This is what he said: 
So to prevent closure, I think first it would have [required an] attitude that there's 
no way this school is going to close down, and there's someone who's willing to 
stay up the late nights and put their own house on the line for it to get it open and 
keep it open. So, first it takes that highly influential point person, or that dedicated 
point person who has a good reputation. [Secondly], it's staying committed to 
trying to collaborate with the district that we're here to stay, we're looking for 
renewal, and then having the growth that demonstrates that this is actually going 
to work. [Third], someone who is cognizant of the planning piece needs to be 
involved, which is, when do the monies come in and how long will those monies 
carry us. [Fourth], align yourself with a church that will give you the one to two 
year piece with room to grow, where you're not going to have to take stuff down 
or put up, or if you are, there's a collaborative plan. Space is defined five months 
before opening. So if you have that I think you're in great shape. That and, 
[lastly], good guiding principles. You have schools that aren't offering the 
specific needs that [were] identified prior to opening. 
This interviewee also offered a no-nonsense sort of approach to the 
recommendation of particular personnel in order to help a charter become successful: 
So you always hear, you should have an attorney with your developers, you 
should have an accountant, the business man, you should have the curriculum 
person. That's all great. You can have varying levels of that. But you really need a 
lot of common sense. You need people who understand people. 
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Since this particular director was essentially running a school with a vision that 
had already been created, the interviewee mentioned that there needs to be some sort of 
cohesion between the developers of the school and those who implement the charter. This 
interviewee also feels that a charter should "offer the niche that the district isn't 
managing well. Don't go head-to-head [with district strategies that are already in place]." 
The interviewee knew that this school definitely had a unique vision; however, the 
commitment and marketability were not present in order to help the school survive. 
Case Study Nine: "I'm Still Thinking My Mistake Was Sticking With It" 
My ninth interviewee had more than nine years of experience as an educational 
administrator before becoming the director of a charter school but did not possess a 
teaching credential or an administrative credential. She declined to answer the question 
regarding her educational background. 
The charter school in this case was started by a pre-apprenticeship training 
program that focused on the building trades for post-high school students. Due to the fact 
that this charter school was created to fit a very specific need, this school could be 
labeled as a Type F, or entrepreneur-initiated charter, based on the typology outlined in 
Chapter Two. Similar to a previous case study, this school had a business partner who 
initiated the charter petition, and was sponsored by the county office of education. The 
interviewee stated that this not-for-profit business organization 
decided to go for a charter school so that they could work with kids ninth through 
twelfth grade. It was started as a charter school that was going to provide 
academics and also do the building trades. The kids would enroll with the 
vocational bent. 
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The beginning. The charter petition was approved through the local county office 
of education in 2004. At that time, the interviewee was a consultant with the non-profit 
corporation involved in writing the charter petition. This corporation also ran post-high 
school vocational training programs. The interviewee had prior experience working with 
partnerships between charter schools and corporations. Initially, the charter school lacked 
the enrollment that had been anticipated, so the school personnel decided to close the 
school and then reopen the following year. The developers of the charter asked the 
interviewee if she would be interested in serving as the director of the re-opened school, 
and she accepted the position. The re-opened school received first-year status again from 
the California Department of Education (CDE), because CDE felt that the charter school 
had "acted responsibly in closing" due to the low enrollment. CDE documented the 
official school start date as September 2005. This account is also reflected in an historical 
summary of the school, contained in the approval of the charter school's closure, 
provided by the superintendent at a board meeting in the spring of 2006. 
The charter school itself never had its own governing board. The board members 
of the original post-high school vocational training program, who had no prior experience 
with charter schools, became the board members for the charter school. The local county 
office of education sponsored the school officially; however, the corporation that 
operated the vocational program ran the school on an operational basis. 
In January of 2006, the school decided to move to an independent study model. 
The school maintained an average daily attendance of 105 to 110 students, and, according 
to the interviewee, "it worked very well. As a matter of fact, it worked better. We had 
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less incidences with the kids, and they got that one-on-one hour every week with their 
teacher." 
Problems and closure. According to the interviewee, around the 2005/2006 
school year, a new superintendent came on board at the county office of education. This 
superintendent did not originally approve the charter petition and, according to the 
interviewee, was not supportive of charter schools. In terms of advanced apportionment 
and funding, the interviewee believed that the county office of education (COE) 
did everything they could [to hinder us]. Things were signed late. Things were 
held up, lost. We didn't get letters that they said they mailed to us. I mean, just all 
kinds of things were going on that just really strapped us for money. 
Additionally, the interviewee indicated that another problem was that the county office of 
education "choked us financially. Meantime, the kids were flourishing, but that [positive 
student achievement] has nothing to do with it." The interviewee suggested that the 
county office of education withheld funding from the charter school which made it 
difficult to operate. 
There also seems to have been a very negative relationship between the 
sponsoring agency (the COE) and the charter school that caused the director to feel 
"hassled". The interviewee believed that the harassment was because the charter school 
had come upon a "political struggle" between a new superintendent at the COE and the 
COE's board. The interviewee stated the following: 
The staff from the COE went to all of the school districts that were under them 
and told their key people, their superintendents and other folks, not to refer any 
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kids to our program, and in fact to tell them that it was an invalid program and 
that they wouldn't get credits and stuff like that. 
The decision-making process at the charter school level also seemed to have a 
negative effect. The interviewee stated that most of the decisions and meetings were 
between the board of the original vocational school and the COE. "We [at the school site] 
were told what the decision was. They [the business partner] would come to me for 
information like, 'What's the enrollment?' and 'What's the ADA?', 'Did you turn in the 
reports?' That kind of thing." Due to the aftermath of this experience, the interviewee felt 
that "no charter school should ever be run under a third tier. You [should] have your own 
board of directors; you [should] have your own governance." 
In the end, this interviewee believed that the charter school was closed because: 
[the COE] just didn't want it. They just didn't want a charter school because of 
the competition and the loss of ADA money. A lot of people will say that the 
COE doesn't really get ADA. They're a county office of education, but they do. 
They have community day schools and they have the probation [students] and 
stuff like that. They do get money for that and those were the kids that we were 
working with. It's a typical thing with charter schools. That's probably the biggest 
hurdle is that you are working under your competition. Your competition is over 
you. If you want to look at it in that respect, I don't think it should be competition. 
I think that they should work together, and I think with successful charter schools, 
there is a way to do it. 
In her open-ended survey response, the interviewee stated the following: "The 
charter was approved by the LEA's (Local Education Authority) Board of Trustees, but 
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administrators did not approve and hindered many processes, including timely funding 
and administrative assistance." This response reflects part of the negative relationship 
the interviewee felt existed between the charter school itself, the business organization, 
and the charter sponsor. 
In a review of the minutes of county board of education meeting from the spring 
of 2006, the non-profit corporation that ran the school notified the county office of 
education in December 2005 that the school was not financially viable with its current 
enrollment of approximately 96 students. The corporation recommended that the county 
office of education close the school no later than the end of the 2005/2006 school year. 
Also stated in the minutes was the following: "Due to financial difficulties, the school 
unilaterally changed its program to a 100 percent independent study non-classroom 
based program in January 2006, which was deemed a violation of the charter." The 
approval of the closure of the school carried unanimously at the spring 2006 board 
meeting. One of the board members stated that the "[charter] proposal was [initially] 
reviewed with a fine toothed comb. It failed because it failed, not because the board 
didn't do its job." 
Advice. One piece of advice that the interviewee felt would make a big difference 
with charter schools was to make community colleges and four-year colleges an LEA so 
that they could sponsor charter schools like districts and county offices of education. That 
way there would be an innate educational focus through the lens of an actual educational 
institution, unlike the muddled and sometimes self-serving focus of the business entity in 
this example. 
The interviewee also thought that there were three items that must be addressed in 
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order for a charter to be successful. First, the charter has to be sure that it is going to have 
a good relationship with their sponsor. Second, the charter needs to be sure that the model 
of the school is embedded in best practice, and that there are data available to prove that 
the model does work. The interviewee knew that the vocational training program that 
existed separate and prior to the charter school was successful, but integrating it into a 
high school educational setting and eventually an independent study program was new. 
There was not any data available to establish the viability of transplanting the vocational 
training program model into a high school setting, and more research could have been 
done to determine whether or not the model had a chance of being successful. Finally, the 
charter school should not have what the interviewee calls a "third layer". The interviewee 
suggested that the governance structure be comprised solely of the board of the charter 
school and the board of the sponsoring agency. After some reflection, the interviewee 
also added that community support is important. 
Finally, the interviewee summed up her ideas regarding the need for charter 
schools: 
California doesn't know how many kids they are losing. I can tell you it's more 
than they're telling, and it's a shame. The kids are not challenged. They're 
frustrated. You talk to the kids and hear that they're not getting what they need to 
get and it's not because they're stupid. So we need something. I think charter 
schools help. It's one tool. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented all nine qualitative interviews in case study format. The 
interview data were triangulated with data from document analysis and the interviewees' 
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responses on the surveys that were completed prior to the interviews. The following 
chapter begins with a summary of cross-case findings and then provides suggestions for 
policy and practice and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to the length of the previous case study descriptions, I have decided to 
present the results of the cross-case analysis and directly respond to the two research 
questions at the outset of this chapter. The second part of the chapter discusses study-
based recommendations for policymakers and practitioners, as well as recommendations 
for researchers who will continue the study of the reasons behind charter school closures. 
A Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
A Methodological Postscript 
Before discussing the findings of my research, I must acknowledge once again the 
flaws with this study. In the study's original design, the major focus was on collecting 
survey data. The qualitative component was intended to merely add a bit of depth to the 
survey data from a large sample of former directors of closed charter schools and what 
they had to say about their closure experiences. Consequently, the plans for the 
qualitative piece were much more modest than they would have been if the primary focus 
was on creating qualitative case studies of the charter school closure experience at 
various sites. There were not plans in this study, for example, to triangulate what the 
former directors said through interviews with other key stakeholders. 
After I discovered that the survey response rate was so low that the survey data 
did not really contribute very much information, I was forced to make the case studies the 
centerpiece of my study. Although I attempted to do whatever within-case study 
triangulation was possible at that point by reviewing board meeting minutes, newspaper 
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articles (when available), and the interviewee's own survey responses, this triangulation 
effort was not nearly as detailed or as extensive as it should have been. 
Consequently, I must emphasize yet again that the findings reported here, even 
about the nine schools of focus, must be viewed with considerable caution. The case 
studies do suggest some intriguing hypotheses about why schools closed and how the 
likelihood of closure might be minimized; however, the operative word here is 
hypotheses. The findings here must be supported by other studies, including some with 
substantially larger samples, before any of the findings that are reported here can be 
viewed as definitive. 
Finally, I must conclude with the idea that many "first" studies generate 
hypotheses from which to develop further study. Although the case studies could have 
been developed more deeply, the stories from the nine individuals and the cross-case 
analyses that were generated are valuable and provide both insight and perspectives that 
have not been explored before. 
Cross-case Analysis Results 
Before proceeding with my announced organizational strategy, I should note that 
there were many similarities, as well as some differences, among the qualitative interview 
responses about the reasons that the interviewed former directors gave for the closure of 
their charter schools. They also provided both similar and different pieces of advice to 
others who wanted to start charter schools. These data are summarized in two matrices 
located in the appendices that support the findings presented below. Appendix E contains 
a matrix of similar themes reflecting the directors' reasons for closure. Appendix F 
contains a matrix of similar themes reflecting the directors' advice for others wanting to 
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start or maintain a charter school. The information contained in these two appendices has 
been used to answer the study's research questions. 
Research Question One: What Are the Reasons Former Charter School Leaders 
Give for the Closure of Their Schools? 
The reasons articulated by former directors. Conflict with the school's 
sponsoring agent was a reason cited by five of the nine interviewees for school closure. 
Some interviewees could document multiple examples of this conflict; others had only a 
single example. The director interviewed for case study nine shared that their school's 
sponsoring agency, a county office of education, "did everything they could [to hinder 
us]. Things were signed late. Things were held up, lost. We didn't get letters that they 
said they mailed to us." 
A negative relationship with the district superintendent was a second theme found 
in the qualitative interviews. Four of the nine interviewees, three of whom also cited 
conflict with the sponsoring district as a major contributor to the school's closure, felt 
that the district superintendent was "anti-charter" or "not a charter advocate." 
Seven of the charter schools in this study were sponsored by school districts; two 
were sponsored by county offices of education. Both of the directors of the schools that 
were sponsored by a county office of education cited conflict with the sponsoring board 
and a negative relationship with the superintendent as two reasons why they felt their 
schools had closed. 
A third theme, issues with securing or paying for facilities, was discovered in 
three of the nine interviews. The director of the school in case study five said, "I couldn't 
have foreseen the closing of the site that [the school] was going to be on. I don't know 
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how you would guarantee something like that." In each of the three case studies in which 
facilities were a factor in school closure, there was no mention of a negative relationship 
with the district superintendent or their sponsoring agency. 
A fourth theme, found in five of the nine interviews (see Appendix E), was 
financial or budgetary issues. For example, these issues ranged from one interviewee 
claiming to have personally financed the salaries of the teachers ("I took out a second 
mortgage on my house to pay salaries, which I'm never going to see again"), to charge-
backs that sponsoring agents or corporate partners were making to the schools that were 
deemed excessive by the schools' directors. The following is one director's account: 
I was not pleased with [our corporate partner] because they were taking a million 
dollars a year in our state funding for their operating expenses. With my research 
and my background, I know that three or four percent was overhead cost, but not 
a million dollars. It was excessive. 
A fifth theme was an ineffective, and sometimes dysfunctional, relationship 
between the charter school and a business or corporate partner. This reason was cited in 
all three of the case studies where there was a business or corporate partner. These 
partnerships looked different in the three different case studies, although in two of the 
case studies (three and seven), the directors named the same educational management 
organization (EMO) as being problematic. In case study three, the for-profit EMO was 
part of the inception of the school and partnered with the sponsoring district. According 
to the director, this EMO provided little to no oversight on the charter school's governing 
board or with day-to-day activities. In case study seven, the director stated the following 
about the EMO, which was also viewed as problematic by the former director of school 
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three: "We [the charter school] were accountable to them [the EMO], but there was no 
back and forth." 
The director of the school discussed in case study nine recalled that their business 
partner was involved as part of the charter school governing board, but seemed to "not 
understand charter school law. They didn't understand any charter school stuff. They 
were very removed from the charter school." One common element among these three 
case studies, however, was that the three interviewees felt that their relationships with 
their corporate partners were anything but effective. 
The sixth and final theme, found in case studies three and seven, was that the 
schools closed partly because of questionable ethical behavior on the part of the business 
partner. Here the emphasis goes well beyond simply having an unproductive relationship 
between the school and the business partner, even though the accusations of unethical 
behavior often contributed to unsuccessful working relationships. In fact, the ethical 
lapses described could be construed, at times, as illegal behavior. Both schools that were 
discussed in these two case studies could be considered entrepreneur-initiated. 
The interviewee from case study three stated the following: "I think I could have 
managed [the business partner], but it felt very yucky. It felt improper. It was ethically 
wrong." The interviewee from case study seven also recounted that she questioned the 
decisions and behaviors of the corporation. The corporation, in turn, supposedly told her 
that she was going to be fired or would have to resign because they didn't like her stirring 
things up. 
A comparison of director's reasons with official reasons for closure. The 
following matrix compares the documented reason for the closure of each school in this 
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study with the reason(s) the directors gave for the closure of the school. The school type 
is also included in order to further examine reasons for closure alongside the 
characterization of the schools that closed. 
Table 1 





Type According to 
Wells, Lopez, Scott, and 
Holme (1999) Typology 
Urban/Ethnocentric/ 
Grassroots 
Founded by charismatic 
educational leader 
Documented 
reason(s) for closure 





and an absence of a 
secured facility 
Reason(s) for 


















































Chose to revert to 
non-charter status 
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Lack of facilities; 
inadequate funding 
Financial difficulties; 
change in program 

























One obvious reason for discrepancies between the third and fourth columns of the 
matrix is that typically there is only one formal documented reason for closure, whereas 
seven of the nine former directors felt that there were multiple reasons that contributed to 
their charter school's closure. Their interpretation, in fact, was that the reasons for their 
schools' closures were too complex to condense into one single reason. 
Even with multiple reasons, there are some interesting patterns that can be 
discerned from reviewing the contents of the matrix. For example, the interviewees in 
case studies one and four cited the same three reasons for their schools' closures: lack of 
support from their sponsoring agents' boards, a negative relationship with the district 
superintendent, and financial or budgetary issues. Both of these schools could be 
categorized as urban/ethnocentric/grassroots. Additionally, the data in case studies two 
and five generated the same themes: lack of support from their sponsoring agents' boards, 
and issues with facilities. These schools were the only two in this study that were 
considered charters founded by charismatic educational leaders. 
Case study six, a parent-led charter school, and case study eight, an 
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots school, were the only two case studies in which the 
directors cited a single reason for closure. Case study six was also the only school where 
the official reason was exactly the same as what the director gave for the reason given for 
closure. This consistency may have something to do with the fact that case study six was 
this study's only conversion charter school and the only school that reverted back to 
traditional public school status rather than simply closing the school building doors. The 
director of this particular school was the only one who came across as apathetic to the 
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loss of his school's charter status. From his perspective, there was no controversy and no 
resistance from faculty or teachers to convert back once again to traditional school status. 
There was also a close correspondence between the documented and director's 
reason for closing in case study eight. According to the director associated with case 
study eight, inadequate facilities were, indeed, the bottom-line cause of the closure. This 
individual did, however, articulate a number of other contributing variables that played a 
part in the closure process. These variables included insufficient student enrollment and 
lack of an aggressive marketing campaign. The director explicitly linked these 
intervening variables, however, with the school's facilities problems (specifically, the 
cost of facilities), one of the official reasons found on California Department of 
Education documentation. 
Finally, case studies two, three, four, and nine had some overlap between the legal 
reason for closure and the director's reasons for closure. In case study two, problems with 
facilities was one of the reasons cited for closure. In case studies three, four, and nine, 
funding or financial issues were found in both categories of closure data. 
If case study six is included, which was the only case study that had an identical 
official reason and director's reason for closure, five of the nine directors in this study 
shared, at the very least, some alignment with the official reason(s) for their schools' 
closures. These schools represented the four different types of charter schools in the 
Wells et. al. typology discussed in earlier chapters of this study. 
On the other hand, four of the directors felt that the official reason(s) given for the 
closure of their schools were inaccurate at best. The types of charter schools represented 
were those founded by a charismatic educational leader, entrepreneur-initiated, and 
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urban/ethnocentric/grassroots. Although this data is not generalizable to other charter 
schools that have closed given the number of case studies in this study, the idea that some 
directors feel there is such a discrepancy in closure data is a component that warrants 
further review and research. 
Research Question Two: What Advice Do These Former Charter School 
Leaders Offer to Those Who Are Interested in Starting or Continuing a Charter 
School? 
In terms of offering advice, there were two themes that surfaced in five different 
case studies. The first theme, found in case studies one, three, four, seven and eight, was 
the need to secure and control finances. This particular advice was offered by the 
directors of all of the schools in this study that could be considered 
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots, and by two of the directors of schools that could be 
regarded as entrepreneur-initiated. In hindsight, these directors felt it was imperative to 
know where money was coming from, where it was going, and who "held the purse 
strings." The director of case study seven, for example, stated, "You have to know where 
the money is. The money was the big key in the running of the school because you can't 
do things without the funding." 
A second theme that was found in five of the nine case studies (case studies two, 
six, seven, eight and nine) involved the perceived need to develop and maintain a 
collaborative relationship with the charter school's sponsoring agency or the sponsoring 
agency's superintendent. These schools embody all four of the Wells et. al. types 
represented in this study. The director of case study six, for example, believed this 
relationship was important because the charter school could be closed at the "whim" of 
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the district. Interestingly this school was not closed, according to the director and official 
documentation, for reasons that reflect an adversarial relationship with its sponsoring 
district. The director of case study eight also emphasized that "staying committed to 
trying to collaborate with the district [reinforces that the charter school] is here to stay 
[and that the school is] looking for renewal." 
The third advice theme, which was found in case studies six, seven, eight and 
nine, was the importance of beginning a charter school with a vision or specific objective. 
The directors that shared this piece of advice came from the study's only parent-led 
charter, an urban/ethnocentric/grassroots charter, and two entrepreneur-initiated charters. 
The director of case study nine (an entrepreneur-initiated charter with a business 
partnership) noted that this vision or objective should be based on "best practice," and 
that there should be "data to prove the model." 
The directors of case studies one, three, and nine (one 
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots and two entrepreneur-initiated) also suggested that a 
business entity should not operate a charter school. Interestingly, case study one was not 
operated by a business. Nevertheless, the director of case study one stated plainly: "I 
don't think business people should be running charters. Many are." In a bit of a 
contradiction, however, this same director also stated that she would recommend "hiring 
a business person or business firm" to conduct the business aspect of the charter school. 
One final point about the advice about charters and for-profit business: Case study seven 
was operated by an EMO, but the former director did not offer the sort of advice that the 
directors in cases one, three and nine provided. 
I l l 
Another advice-related theme, found in case studies six and eight (parent-led and 
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots), was the recommendation to maintain a high level of 
enthusiasm and energy. The interviewee associated with case study eight believed that 
there needs to be an "attitude that there's no way this school is going to close down. 
Someone [needs to be willing] to stay up the late nights and put their own house on the 
line to get [the charter school] open and keep it open." 
The director of case study five, a charter school categorized as being founded by a 
charismatic educational leader, classified her advice under what she believed could have 
been done differently in order to keep her school open. This director cited the need for a 
larger student population (low enrollment happened to be the legal reason why the school 
closed, but it was not one of the reasons she cited for why the school closed). Instead, her 
advice focused on the need to have a large potential applicant pool. In fact, she stated that 
she believed access to large numbers of students was the reason many charter schools 
wanted to be in urban areas, because "you have a lot of kids to draw from." 
Although none of the directors suggested "knowing charter school law" as a 
specific form of advice to give to others, data from four of the case studies reflect that the 
directors strongly believed that if they were more privy to charter school law, aware of 
changes in the law, or knew how to enforce the law, their particular schools may still be 
open today. 
The director of case study two, a charter founded by a charismatic educational 
leader, believed her school would have stayed open if the state would have "enforced 
charter school rules, because we should not have been held to the memorandum of 
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understanding [with the sponsoring district]. The charter school law is what should apply. 
The state wasn't willing to enforce the law in any way." 
The director of case study three, an entrepreneur-initiated charter school, shared 
that her and her staff should have been constantly aware of "the most recent rules, 
regulations, and laws that are going to impact [the school's] funding." 
In case study nine, another entrepreneur-initiated charter school, the director 
thought that the school's business partner should have exercised its "legal rights" to make 
the school's sponsoring agent (a county office of education) aware that the business felt 
that the COE was not fulfilling its responsibilities as an authorizing agent. 
Finally, the director of the only parent-led charter school in the study thought that 
his school would still be a charter school today "if the school district hadn't come to us 
and said with the new changes in law, you're going to cost us more money as a charter 
school." 
After looking at the data and types of schools associated with each piece of 
advice, the advice spans across the different types of schools represented in this study 
from the Wells et. al. typology. There is no single piece of advice that comes from the 
directors of one particular type of charter school. 
When it came to the professional experience and education of the directors 
included in this study, five had less than three years of administrative experience prior to 
directing their respective charter schools. The educational backgrounds of these five 
ranged from "some graduate school" to doctoral degrees. Three directors had more than 
nine years of experience prior to directing their charter schools: one of these directors had 
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a bachelor's degree, one had a master's degree, and one had a doctoral degree. One 
director had approximately six years of experience with a master's degree. 
Three of the five directors that recommended the advice of "securing and 
controlling finances" had less than three years of administrative experience prior to 
directing their charter schools. Three of the five directors that suggested the importance 
of "developing and maintaining collaboration and relationships with sponsoring agency" 
also had been an administrator for less than three years before joining or starting their 
charter schools. Two of these directors recommended this advice in addition to "securing 
and controlling finances." The more experienced administrators, however, were still 
represented in these advice groups. 
None of the five advice themes were limited to either the fairly inexperienced 
directors or the more seasoned directors. This may suggest that the advice generated from 
these charters' closures can be attributed to the nature of being a charter school 
(particularly a start-up charter school), and that the closures cannot entirely be ascribed to 
administrative lack of experience. 
Summary 
The revised purpose of this study was to 1) ascertain both the legal and director-
stated reasons for some California charter school closures and 2) explore what advice 
administrators of closed charter schools would give to those wanting to open, or continue 
to operate, a viable charter school. Although this dissertation was initially designed as a 
mixed-methodology study, the resulting research focused on nine qualitative interviews, 
which were triangulated with the interviewees' survey responses and document analysis. 
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In the qualitative interviews, the administrators' stated reasons for the closures 
fell into six themes: conflict with the sponsoring board, negative relationship with the 
sponsoring district or COE superintendent, issues with facilities, financial or budgeting 
issues, ineffective collaboration with a business partner, and questions of ethical behavior 
by a business partner. Five of the nine interviewees felt their schools closed primarily 
because of a negative relationship with their charter sponsor, which in all cases was their 
local district's school board or county office of education. Five of the nine interviews 
referred to fiscal problems as one of the major reasons for the school's closure. Four of 
the nine interviewees mentioned that a negative relationship with the superintendent of 
the district or COE that granted the charter contributed to the school's downfall. Among 
these three themes, case studies one, four, and nine cited all three as reasons why they felt 
their schools closed. Case studies one and four could be typed as 
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots; case nine could be considered entrepreneur-initiated and 
had a partnership with a business. There seem to be few similarities among the schools 
and their directors, other than their reasons for closure. 
Five of the nine interviewees (case studies one, three, four, seven, and nine) felt 
that, in order to maintain or open a successful charter school, the administrator needs to 
have secure control over the finances and budget of the school (see Appendix F). 
Additionally, five directors (case studies two, six, seven, eight, and nine) also said that 
the development and maintenance of relationships with the sponsoring agency will 
positively impact a charter school. Five of nine (case studies one, six, seven, eight, and 
nine) cited that a charter school director must begin with a vision or specific objective 
that everyone can rally around. Of these three responses, case studies seven and eight 
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included all three pieces of advice in their responses. Interestingly enough, these two case 
studies are different types within the Wells et. al. typology that closed for different 
reasons. 
Recommendations 
A study with an n of nine has inevitable limitations that must be acknowledged. 
On the other hand, such a study can have considerable heuristic value if it highlights 
issues to consider and hypotheses to test in other situations. This study lends itself to a 
variety of recommendations for those in the charter school field. Additionally, leaders 
and school reform enthusiasts in the traditional public school system may also benefit 
from the results of this study. I have formulated several recommendations after analyzing 
the data. 
Policy and Practice 
First, there seems to be a need for a formal support network among new charter 
school directors. Many of the directors in this study lacked an administrative credential, 
and although this may not have directly contributed to the school closure, the study 
participants clearly voiced the need for additional support, especially when it came to 
legal and financial issues, as reported earlier in this chapter. To be sure, there are 
networks, such as the California Charter School Association, that offer support and 
advice, but none of the interviewees mentioned those agencies as influential in their 
tenure as charter school directors. Although the interviewees were not asked specifically 
about support they received from agencies outside of their sponsoring agencies, two of 
the former directors mentioned attending a training or workshop designed to support 
charter school operators prior to opening their respective schools. 
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There are some associations in the state that sponsor workshops and support for 
charter schools in general; however, these directors seemed to have needed something 
more: something specific to their needs and abilities beyond having a passion to serve a 
particular community, wanting to address the needs of an underserved population of 
students, or desiring more freedom from district rules and regulations. It is still unclear as 
to whether or not the existence of CMOs (Charter Management Organizations) as a 
means of support has any impact on the sustainability of charter schools, particularly 
schools with new or inexperienced leadership, since they were not mentioned as a 
component in any of the case studies included in this research. CMOs, according to the 
Center on Reinventing Public Education (2007), are non-profit organizations that seek to 
manage charter schools by replicating successful schools in multiple locations. 
Under the umbrella of support, each sponsoring agency should provide the charter 
school with a neutral charter school liaison who is available to help with charter renewal, 
procedural information, and other operating issues. Many of the directors I interviewed 
had powerful visions for their schools, but little practical experience. 
Businesses or corporations that choose to partner with charter schools, 
particularly those that are funding sources for the schools, should require their personnel 
to be trained in areas of charter school law and education in general. In fact, charter 
schools that are seeking business partners should insist on appropriate preparation for the 
business so that the elements of charter school law and/or operation are clearly 
understood. 
The following table reflects statements made by each of the three directors whose 
schools worked with or were managed by a business or educational management 
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organization (EMO). Since this data comes from directors of charter schools that have 
closed, the data suggest that there is a need for businesses involved in charter school 
management or support to become aware of the specificities that come with operating 
charter schools. 
Table 2 
Statements by Directors That Reflect the Need for Business or EMO to Know Charter 
School Law and/or Operation 





"[The EMO] needed knowledge of how 
[charter] schools work within the system, 
how funding happens, what the 
mechanisms of support are." 
"The business [EMO] didn't know what 
they were doing. I think they got in over 
their heads." 
"[Our business partner] didn't have a 
handle on the educational system and how 
it works. They really didn't understand 
charter school law at all." 
Further Research 
The charter school field would benefit from a much more securely triangulated 
study that utilizes more quantitative data to support qualitative research. Due to the fact 
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that I asked people to share what could be considered significant failures in their 
professional lives, I, undoubtedly, should have anticipated with much greater certainty 
that I would have encountered difficulty collecting responses to the quantitative surveys. 
Further research, perhaps, could focus on more recent closures first, so that 
contact information is more current and accessible. Additionally, more qualitative data 
are needed to tell the story of charter school closures. This data should come from 
multiple stakeholders, including parents, students, teachers, and representatives from the 
sponsoring agencies, as well as former directors. 
Because of the problems associated with finding information for this study, it is 
recommended that a newly created central database be established to collect information 
on closed charter schools. As a part of the closure process, charter schools would be 
required to submit a report to this database that would document, among other things, the 
years of operation, the sponsoring agent, and the documented legal reason for closure. 
Some organizations have attempted this sort of documentation; however, after a cross-
analysis of documents, it was discovered that some schools were present in one 
document, but not another. Due to the lack of organization of information surrounding 
charter school closures, any information that can be accessed on one place would be a 
first step in benefiting the field as a whole. 
Conclusion 
The unanticipated consequences that resulted from this study will certainly be of 
some use in the context of future charter school research, particularly when it comes to 
charter school closures. 
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This study, in fact, demonstrates how difficult it is to locate individuals for a 
study regarding an event that already has occurred; it is exponentially more difficult to 
locate people willing to participate in a study in which they may have contributed to the 
closure of a school. 
When individuals were located, they more than likely shared one side of the 
charter school closure story, in order to ensure that they did not take sole (or in some 
cases, any) responsibility for their particular charter school's closure. Even if the former 
directors knew that their actions had a substantial impact on the closure of the school, 
they probably would not fully disclose the full account of their own personal failure. 
What we do not find in a study of this nature is equally as important as what we 
do find. Since none of the charter schools examined in this study were considered 
teacher-led charter schools (according to the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme typology), it 
would be important to determine whether or not teacher-led charters are more successful 
than the other typologies of charter schools, or, at the very least, why they might be less 
likely to close. What, if anything, is different about teacher-led charters? 
Conversely, the majority of schools examined in this study were considered 
charter schools guided by charismatic leaders or schools that were founded to serve a 
specific population of underserved students (urban/grassroots/ethnocentric). Are these 
schools just simply more likely to close? Or are the leaders of these schools, because of 
their personalities, more willing to participate in this sort of study so that their voices are 
heard? 
Charter schools, and those that lead them, are not only dynamic, but they possess 
the potential to be influential in the realm of school reform. We certainly can learn from 
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charter schools that thrive; on the other hand we can, and should, continue to learn from 
those that are less successful as long as there are those who are willing to share their 
stories in order to have an impact on our educational system. 
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Introduction Letter for Quantitative Surveys 
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To Whom It May Concern: 
My name is Jennifer Reiter-Cook, and I am a doctoral student at the University of 
San Diego. I obtained your contact information through a list of closed and revoked 
charter schools on the California Department of Education website. I would be incredibly 
grateful if you would be willing to participate in my dissertation study regarding charter 
schools that have closed. Information from this study will contribute to knowledge in the 
field of charter schools, especially for those who are interested in becoming charter 
school sponsors or operators, as well as institutions that are involved in providing 
professional development for charter school leaders. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at any 
time. Data collected prior to withdrawal by the participant will not be used, unless the 
participant gives permission through writing. Your personal information will be kept 
confidential. 
You can assist by filling out a survey that will be sent to you in one week. This 
survey will ask your opinion regarding the closure of the school that you managed. The 
information you provide will help those interested in charter schools by allowing your 
experiences to be shared. Additionally, there will be no public association between your 
name and your survey responses. 
After the surveys have been collected, I might contact you regarding a follow-up 
interview. You may choose to participate in the interview or not. 
Please respond to this email if you would be willing to complete the survey. If 
you have any questions, you can reach me at jcook 105(alcox.net or (619) 962-1342. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
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Appendix B 
Charter School Closure Survey 
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1.1 have read the introductory letter that accompanied the survey link, and agree to 
voluntarily answer the following 18 survey questions. Yes No 
Please answer the following questions about your professional experience and 
preparation. 
2. Prior to administrating at the charter school, how long had you been an administrator? 
Less than 1 year 1-3 years 4-6 years 7-9 years More than 9 years 
3. What is your educational background? 
Bachelor's Degree 




4. Do you hold a teaching credential? 
Yes No 
5. Do you hold an educational administrative credential? 
Yes No 
Please respond to the following statements based on your experience with a charter 
school closure. 
6. Loss of facilities led to the closure of the charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
7. Other problems with facilities led to the closure of the charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
8. Personnel issues contributed to the closure of my charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
9. Lack of trainings and/or professional development opportunities for myself and my 
staff led to the closure of the charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
10. Lack of proper financial management led to the closure of my charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
11. Low student enrollment led to the closure of the charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12. Lack of appropriate student achievement led to the closure of my charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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13. There was little or no growth in student achievement while the charter school was in 
existence. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
14. There were no ethical violations that led to the closure of the charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
15. The charter school operated under principles of fairness and decency. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
16. The charter school I worked for closed solely for the legal reasons stated. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
17. Analyzing formal closure documents for the school would give a clear and complete 
picture of the reasons for my charter school's closure. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
18.1 have an opinion as to how I would do things differently if I were managing the 
closed charter school again. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
19.1 have advice to give to those who want to begin or work in a charter school. 
Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly Disagree 
20. Please list any reasons other than those offered above as possible contributing factors 
to your charter school's closure. You may also use this space to elaborate on any of your 
answers to the survey items above. 
21. If you would like to be contacted to be interviewed regarding the responses on this 
survey, please enter your email address and/or phone number below: 
Thank you very much for your time in completing this survey. 
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Appendix C 
University of San Diego 
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
133 
Jennifer Reiter-Cook, a doctoral student in the Leadership Studies program in the School 
of Education at the University of San Diego, is conducting research on the closure of 
charter schools and information that can benefit current and future charter school 
operators by alerting them to factors that led to the closure of other charter schools. 
1. Participants will be interviewed between 45 minutes to one hour per interview, 
with a maximum of two interviews. 
2. Participants will be given a brief background and overview of the study. The 
researcher will explain the interview process, and ensure each participant have an 
understanding of their rights as participants in the study. 
3. The interview will be conducted at a location that is acceptable to the participant, 
at a time that will not interfere with the participants' work or other 
responsibilities. 
4. Interviews will be recorded and transcribed. 
5. Efforts will be undertaken to ensure confidentiality by keeping data in a locked 
cabinet or password protected file on the computer, through the use of 
pseudonyms, and by giving participants an opportunity to review their transcripts 
and delete material that might identify them, confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed. Data will be destroyed after 5 years, following completion of the 
dissertation project. 
6. Although these efforts will be undertaken to ensure confidentiality, risks of 
participants being identified by others in the field are possible. 
7. Information from this study will contribute to knowledge in the field of charter 
schools, especially for those who are interested in becoming charter school 
sponsors or operators, as well as institutions that are involved in providing 
professional development for charter school leaders. 
8. Participation in this study is voluntary. A participant may withdraw from the 
study at any time. Data collected prior to withdrawal by the participant will not 
be used, unless the participant gives permission through writing. 
9. If a participant has any questions about this study, or activities that occur during 
the course of this study, he or she may contact Jennifer Reiter-Cook at 619-962-
1342 Gcookl05@cox.net), or Dr. Robert Donmoyer at 619-260-7445 
(donmoyer@cox.net), the faculty advisor for this study. 
10. The information collected will be used to complete class assignments and may 
also be used in other publications the author writes about the topic of this study. 
11. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that which is expressed on this 
consent form. 
I, the undersigned, understand the above conditions and give my consent to my voluntary 
participation in the research that has been described. 
Signature of Interviewee Date 
Printed Name Address 







a) The participant will be given the opportunity to create a timeline 
regarding their involvement in the charter school through its closure. The 
guide questions that follow will be used a) if the participant chooses not to 
participate in the timeline activity or b) if there are gaps in the information 
presented in the timeline that need to be clarified. 
b) What are your experiences in relation to your charter school closure? 
• When did you become involved? 
• Who else was involved? 
• Who was responsible for drafting charter petition? 
• What issues/problems, if any, were present from the beginning? 
• What strengths were evident? 
• Who had significant influence in decision-making processes? 
Opinions 
a) Leading up to closure: what was going on? 
b) Closure of school: why do you feel the school closed? Does this differ 
from documented reasons? 
c) Preventive measures: what could have been done, in your opinion, to keep 
the school open? 




Qualitative Interview Cross-Case Analysis Matrix: Reasons for Closure 
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Case study numbers 
1,2,4,5,9 
Theme generated 
Conflict with, or lack of 
support from, sponsoring 
board 
Supporting quotes 
Interview 1: "I reached out 
and said I wanted to talk 
about [the renewal 
application] prior to the 
renewal and they never 
responded." 
Interview 2: "We found out 
from the lenders we were 
seeking that [the sponsoring 
district] was telling them not 
to invest with us because 
they were going to take the 
petition." 
"We'd hire a teacher and a 
week later she'd be offered a 
position in [a district 
school]." 
Interview 4: "The mandate 
[from the county office of 
education (COE)] was that 
we would start school 
number two by the second 
138 
year. We did that, but now 
how are we going to pay for 
this? So [the COE] said, 
'It's not our problem. We're 
not a lending institution and 
we're not a loan institution 
either so if you cannot 
sustain yourself, we're 
going to close you down.'" 
Interview 5: "One of the 
huge [problems] was the 
board support. I had to wait 
for five months before 
they'd say they'd take the 
[grant] money [from the 
state]." 
Interview 9: The county 
office of education (COE) 
"did everything they could 
[to hinder us]. Things were 
signed late. Things were 
held up, lost. We didn't get 
letters that they said they 
139 
1,4,7,9 Negative relationship with 
superintendent 
mailed to us." 
Interview 1: "[The 
superintendent] came on the 
spring of our first year. In 
the fall, we had a big grant 
and he was sitting on the 
check, he didn't issue the 
check." 
"Our superintendent doesn't 
talk to people." 
Interview 4: "Word came to 
me that [the new county 
superintendent] was very 
anti-charter, and I was told 
to keep everything up 
because [the superintendent] 
is out to close [charter] 
schools down." 
Interview 7: "There was a 
change in admin in the 
district halfway through 
which changed the whole 
complexion. The first 
140 
2,5,8 Issues with facilities 
superintendent was looking 
at the charter school as 
bringing in money to the 
district. She retired, and then 
the second superintendent 
looked at charter schools as 
being problems and not 
seeing it as a benefit to the 
district, and so the 
relationship went way 
downhill when the 
administration changed." 
Interview 9: The new 
superintendent "inherited 
[the charter school] and 
didn't want it. He's not a 
charter school advocate." 
Interview 2: "[The district] 
said that we were out of a 
building, even though we 
had another building." 
Interview 5: "I couldn't have 
foreseen the closing of the 
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1,3,4,7,9 Financial/Budget issues 
site that [the school] was 
going to be on. I don't know 
how you would guarantee 
something like that." 
Interview 8: "If the district 
didn't drag their feet, and 
they were more reasonable 
in finding us space, if they 
collaborated instead of 'You 
are on your own'. I couldn't 
personally make it happen." 
Interview 1: "I took out a 
second mortgage on my 
house to pay salaries, which 
I'm never going to see 
again." 
Interview 3: "The school 
district was inappropriately 
collecting high fees from us. 
The contract [with the 
business partner] which was 
around 22/23 percent was 
excessive." 
142 
The business partner "didn't 
tell us that there was all this 
money sitting in reserve. 
Not having any access to the 
detail, we very much had the 
impression that we were 
going bankrupt." 
Interview 4: "We were not 
able to financially maintain 
the school." 
Interview 7: "I was not 
pleased with the [business 
running the school] because 
they were taking a million 
dollars a year in our state 
funding for their operating 
expenses. And with my 
research and my 
background, I know that 3 
percent, 4 percent was 
overhead cost, but not a 
million dollars. It was 
excessive." 
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Charter worked ineffectively 
with business partner 
Interview 9: The county 
office of education "choked 
us financially. Meantime, 
the kids were flourishing, 
but that has nothing to do 
with it." 
Interview 3: "The oversight 
was, as far as I could tell, 
not very much of anything." 
Interview 7: "That 
entrepreneurial thing of 
having a company running a 
school I don't think was a 
good idea. I think that that 
was the downfall of the 
school." 
Interview 9: The business 
running the charter school 
"did not understand charter 
school law. They didn't 
understand any charter 
school stuff. They were very 
removed from the charter 
144 
3,7 Questioned ethical behavior 
by business partner 
school." 
Interview 3: "The oversight 
as far as I can tell was not 
much of anything. There 
was no teacher training. 
There was no oversight of 
work. There was no 
verification of what sorts of 
materials were purchased 
with the budgets they were 
given to buy things. There 
were rumors of trips to 
Hawaii." 
"I think I could have 
managed [the business 
partner], but it felt very 
yucky. It felt improper. It 
was ethically wrong." 
Interview 7: "I was 
questioning a lot of things. 
They basically told me that I 
was going to be fired or 
[would have to] resign 
145 
because they didn't like 
what I was leading the 








Secure and control finances 
Supporting quotes 
Interview 1: "A million 
147 
[dollars is] about right." 
"A million dollars in the 
bank. I'm deadly serious 
about that." 
Interview 3: "The people 
who are directly running the 
day to day operations [need 
to] have a handle on the 
budget." 
Interview 4: "If [charter 
schools] don't have any 
money, stay out of the 
business. That's all there is 
to it." 
Interview 7: "You have to 
know where the money is. 
The money was the big key 
in the running of the school 
because you can't do things 
without the funding." 
"We had a school site 
council yet we could make 
no decisions or anything 
148 
Develop and maintain 
collaboration and 
relationships with 
sponsoring agency or other 
district representative 
because there was no 
knowledge of what our 
budget was really." 
Interview 8: "Someone who 
is cognizant of the planning 
piece needs to be involved, 
which is, when do the 
monies come in and how 
long will those monies carry 
us." 
Interview 2: "It doesn't 
matter what kind of 
relationship you may have 
with the district, it is the 
relationship with that person 
at the oversight with the 
charter school that is really 
going to be the playing 
point." 
Interview 6: "You've got to 
have the support of that 
district because you could 
be a little bit at the whim of 
149 
that district." 
Interview 7: "Strong tie to a 
district office so that the 
district was really a 
proponent of the school, 
that the district participated 
in the operation of the 
school." 
"You have to have solid 
backing of the district 
because charter schools 
have to be sponsored by the 
district. You have to have a 
good relationship person 
right there with the 
superintendent because if 
the superintendent isn't pro, 
it's not going to work you." 
Interview 8: "It's staying 
committed to trying to 
collaborate with the district 
that we're here to stay, 
we're looking for renewal, 
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6, 7, 8, 9 Begin with a vision or 
specific objective 
and then having the growth 
that demonstrates that this is 
actually going to work." 
Interview 9: "You can have 
the relationship with the 
board, the board can 
approve [the charter], but 
it's the relationship with 
[the superintendent and his 
top staff people]. He can 
take [items] to the board 
and get the support." 
Interview 6: "My first 
question [if someone 
wanted to start a charter 
school] would be, why?" 
Interview 7: "You need to 
have a goal out there that 
this is what you want to 
achieve. With this school, 
ours was to meet the needs 
of the population that was 
not fitting in to the regular 
151 
Business entity should not 
operate school 
public schools. It has to be 
clear defined and you have 
to have a vision of how 
you're going to meet that." 
Interview 8: "Offer the 
niche that the district isn't 
managing well. Don't go 
head to head." 
Interview 9: "Make sure 
that the model that you have 
is best practice. You [need 
to have] data that proves 
this model." 
Interview 1: "I don't think 
business people should be 
running charters. Many 
are." 
Interview 3: "A 100% 
business approach is not 
student centered and won't 
work." 
Interview 9: "Make sure 
you don't have a third layer. 
152 
I highly suggest that it's the 
charter school and 
authorizing agency, period." 
6,8 Maintain high level of 
energy/enthusiasm 
Interview 6: "If you try and 
[run the charter] by 
yourself, there just won't be 
enough energy to do that 
and run the school. You 
need to have a lot of buy 
in." 
Interview 8: "I think first it 
would have been attitude 
that there's no way this 
school is going to close 
down, and there's someone 
who's willing to stay up the 
late nights and put their own 
house on the line to get it 
open and keep it open." 
